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Tammy Lynn Cook, a mentally ill mother, lost her parental rights 
and custody of her son and daughter whom she had abused and ne-
glected.1  Rejecting her appeal, the court discussed at length Cook’s 
failure to cooperate with social services and the treatment offered to 
her, as well as the lack of improvement in her parenting since the ini-
tial removal of her children.  Because of her “reckless actions”2 in re-
gards to her own mental health, the court held it was “clearly not in 
the children’s best interests for mother to maintain her . . . parental 
rights . . . with no evidence that mother will ever rectify the condi-
tions that posed harm to them.”3  On its face, this ruling seems rea-
sonable as it privileges children’s safety and well-being over the pa-
rental rights of a mother who harms them and is continuously unable 
to recover from her mental illness.  But digging deeper into the issue 
of parental mental health and the consequential neglect or abuse of 
children could teach otherwise.  Separating parents and children 
need not always be the only way to protect children. 
 
 1 See Cook v. Roanoke Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 2930-00-3, 2001 WL 7467686 (Va. Ct. App. 
July 3, 2001). 
 2 Id. at *4. 
 3 Id. 
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With the decrease of treatment in hospital commitment settings 
and an increase of community-based services, the number of parents 
with schizophrenia—in particular, women—has grown.4  Additionally, 
women with severe mental illness are just as likely as mentally healthy 
women to marry and have children, but are at a higher risk of losing 
custody of their children.5  Studies suggest that as much as 70–80% of 
parents that have a mental illness lose custody of their children.6  
Ironically, it is the fear of losing their children that deters parents 
from seeking much needed treatment that could help prevent ne-
glect or abuse of children.7  If parents do turn to services, these often 
are inadequate in addressing their special needs both as people with 
a severe mental illness and as parents.8  However, not all services are 
futile.  Since the 1970s, social sciences have developed treatment 
plans—Programs of Assertive Community Treatment (PACTs)—that 
have been proven effective in achieving recovery for people with se-
vere mental illness, particularly schizophrenia.  Moreover, PACTs are 
also highly successful in improving performance in different areas of 
life, including parenting and family functioning.  Over ten states have 
PACTs as part of state-sponsored social services,9 and others have 
even incorporated PACTs into their legal system as an alternative to 
criminal proceedings.10 
 
 4 See Barry J. Ackerson, Parents with Serious and Persistent Mental Illness:  Issues in Assessment 
and Services, SOC. WORK, Spring 2003, at 187, 188 (discussing an unexpected “increase in 
women with a severe mental illness bearing and raising children”).  To clarify, this is not 
to say that there are more people, or women, suffering from schizophrenia because of the 
decrease in hospitalization—only that there are more people with schizophrenia who be-
come parents, and that these people tend to be women. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Carolyn Mason et al., Clients with Mental Illness and Their Children:  Implications for Clinical 
Practice, 28 ISSUES MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 1105, 1106 (2007) (noting that rates of cus-
tody loss by parents with mental illness have been reported as high as 80%). 
 7 See Ackerson, supra note 4, at 191 (stating that social services that are designed to improve 
parenting skills are not fitted for parents with mental illnesses.  Parents with mental ill-
ness, then, often drop out of such programs or—if they do participate—are unable to 
benefit from them. “[T]he didactic method of instruction combined with the severity of 
[these parents’] illness may impede their ability to apply the lessons to their own situa-
tions”). 
 8 See id. at 193 (considering the unique role social work can have in addressing the needs of 
people with mental illness and parents in general). 
 9 See Paul B. Gold et al., The Program of Assertive Community Treatment:  Implementation and 
Dissemination of an Evidence-Based Model of Community-Based Care for Persons with Severe and 
Persistent Mental Illness, 10 COGNITIVE & BEHAV. PRAC. 290, 295–96 (2003) (discussing the 
states with PACTs as a part of state sponsored social services, including Delaware, Florida, 
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, North Carolina, New Jersey, New Mexico, South Dakota, 
Texas, Virginia, and Rhode Island). 
 10 Such states include Florida and Texas.  See discussion infra Part III.B. 
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In light of PACTs and their advantages, this Article argues that the 
solution the law provides to families struggling with parental mental 
illness—that is, family separation in the form of children’s removal or 
termination of parental rights—is highly troubling.  Using a funda-
mental right concept to family integrity as a starting point,11 I argue 
that separating children from parents without exploring an alterna-
tive that has a higher potential for success overly burdens family in-
tegrity.12  Moreover, child protection is a suspect justification for such 
a severe infringement, because it does not consider the need to pro-
tect children from the harms of removal, such as abuse and neglect in 
foster care, or psychological wounds caused by separation from at-
tachment figures in the child’s family of origin.  As such, family sepa-
ration jeopardizes substantive due process rights of families both as 
individuals and as a collective.13  My argument, however, should not 
be taken to be overly sweeping.  I do not mean to state that in all cas-
es family separation violates substantive due process rights.  I merely 
maintain that lawmakers should be aware of the heightened risk of 
unnecessary separations.  Substantive due process, therefore, re-
quires—at the very least—exploring PACTs as a less restrictive alter-
native. 
I build my argument in three steps.  In Part I, I discuss schizo-
phrenia and its impact on parenting and on children of parents with 
schizophrenia.  I choose to focus on schizophrenia because of its ex-
treme severity and its debilitating effects on almost all levels of func-
tioning.  Such all-encompassing impairments create substantial chal-
lenges to parenting, but do not necessarily negate parenting abilities 
altogether in all cases.  Therefore a choice between family preserva-
tion and family separation is all the more complex.  Part I goes on to 
present the current models of legal interventions on the federal and 
 
 11 Though not explicitly terming this as a right to “family integrity,” the Supreme Court has 
long recognized a parent’s fundamental right to the childrearing, custody and compan-
ionship of her child.  As this Article progresses, I present the argument that both children 
and parents should enjoy this fundamental right, and that they should be able to hold 
this right as a family unit, that is, that family integrity is an aggregated right of the family 
as a collective.  See infra Part II.A. 
 12 Throughout this Article I use the terms “family integrity,” “family unity” and “family pres-
ervation” interchangeably.  All refer to keeping the family as a cohesive unit, where pa-
rental rights remain intact and parents are the custodians and caregivers of their chil-
dren.  I use these terms in opposition to removal of children from the home or 
termination of parental rights, which I refer to as “family separation.” 
 13 See infra Part II.A.2, where I argue that fundamental rights, both of parents and of chil-
dren, should not be considered as conflicting positions or interests.  Rather, where family 
preservation is concerned, these rights can, and should, be viewed as complementing 
each other, and therefore as aggregated. 
Mar. 2010] DUE PROCESS THROUGH COMPREHENSIVE CARE 789 
 
state levels.  Most state laws are designed to protect children from 
harm at the hands of parents with schizophrenia, primarily through 
family separation.  In doing so, these states comply with the overarch-
ing framework of privileging family separation that federal law dic-
tates.  I later focus on Virginia law as representative of most other 
states, and as a good example of how state laws burden parents with 
mental illness.  Virginia law adds additional burdens, however, be-
cause it articulates a presumption that, as a rule, mental illness causes 
unfit parenting.  Because of the harshness of Virginia law, this state is 
in much need of change to better serve families and uphold substan-
tive due process rights.  Yet Virginia also has immense potential to 
lead toward positive growth, because it already has operating state-
sponsored PACTs. 
Part II concentrates on my argument that family separation is in-
consistent with substantive due process.  I apply the test the Supreme 
Court utilized in Washington v. Glucksberg,14 which first requires the ex-
istence of a fundamental right.  Here, I argue that aggregating al-
ready recognized fundamental rights of parents and children would 
elevate family preservation to the level of a fundamental right, as well.  
Next, the Glucksberg test applies strict scrutiny to the state’s infringe-
ment on that fundamental right.  Put differently, removal or termina-
tion of parental rights must be narrowly tailored to serve the state’s 
compelling interest, i.e., child protection.  Following this substantive 
due process test, my analysis leads me to conclude that family separa-
tion fails to protect children from harm and therefore does not serve 
the state’s purported compelling interest. 
Part III expands on the “narrowly tailored” prong of the strict 
scrutiny test.  Here, I argue that the availability of PACTs as effective 
treatment for people with schizophrenia renders them a less restric-
tive means to family separation.  I go on to demonstrate how PACTs 
have been utilized as a less restrictive alternative to criminal proceed-
ings in Florida.  The operation of PACTs in Florida demonstrates 
how PACTs are a beneficial, interdisciplinary solution to the multi-
tude of issues that families struggle with when a parent suffers from 
schizophrenia.  Part III also argues that in order to ensure their effi-
cacy as a less restrictive alternative for families, PACTs should be de-
signed to provide families with comprehensive services that will pro-
mote parents’ recovery as well as children’s well-being.  However, 
even in their family-oriented form, PACTs still may raise concerns.  
For this reason, I end Part III grappling with some of the potential 
 
 14 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
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oppositions to the PACTs solution I advocate.  Particularly, I address 
the doubt that PACTs do in fact protect children, and the concern 
that PACTs establish positive rights that overly burden the state by 
requiring provision of services.  I conclude by highlighting Virginia’s 
leading role in changing current interventions and by introducing 
other fields of family law and parental unfitness in which substantive 
due process should be re-examined. 
I.  MENTAL DISABILITIES AND PARENTING 
A.  Schizophrenia—A Typology 
At the outset, a discussion of schizophrenia and its symptoms, di-
agnostic process and prognosis is imperative in order to understand 
the parenting issues surrounding it.  Misconceptions around schizo-
phrenia among social service providers and legal professionals lead to 
more separations of children from parents than necessary.  A better 
understanding of parenting with schizophrenia facilitates a more nu-
anced view of who can be a capable parent despite the illness and 
which the law, in turn, ought to reflect.  Schizophrenia is a severe 
mental illness,15 characterized by a breakdown of personality func-
tions, withdrawal from reality and disturbed emotional and cognitive 
processes.16  The impaired sense of reality is mainly manifested 
through delusions, illusions and hallucinations.17  While this wide va-
riety of disturbances to thought, perception, emotion, motivation and 
motor activities typical of schizophrenia could result in an inability to 
function or care for one’s self, other persons may only experience a 
minor decrease in coping abilities.18 
 
 15 See Laurie T. Izutsu, Applying Atkins v. Virginia to Capital Defendants with Severe Mental Ill-
ness, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 995, 1012 (2005) (discussing that the term “severe mental illness” 
is usually restricted to schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder and bipolar disorder). 
 16 Schizophrenic disorder, in AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, GLOSSARY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TERMS, 
available at http://www.apa.org/research/action/glossary.aspx#s (last visited Feb. 16, 
2010). 
 17 See Krista A. Gallager, Note, Parents in Distress:  A State’s Duty to Provide Reunification Services 
to Mentally Ill Parents, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 234, 236 (2000) (discussing the 
disorted perceptions of reality experienced by people with schizophrenia).  Delusions are 
false beliefs founded on mistaken interpretations of reality, which are inconsistent with 
one’s intelligence or culture and persist despite reason or evidence of their incorrectness.  
Hallucinations are false sensory perceptions that do not derive from actual, real stimuli.  
In schizophrenia, hallucinations tend to be auditory, though visual hallucinations are 
common as well.  See Éva Szeli, Ex Parte Civil Commitment, Family Care-Givers, and Schizophre-
nia:  A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 529, 530–31 (2000) (con-
sidering hallucinations and delusions of people with schizophrenia). 
 18 Peter F. Liddle, Descriptive Clinical Features of Schizophrenia, in 1 NEW OXFORD TEXTBOOK 
OF PSYCHIATRY 571 (Michael G. Gelder et al. eds., 2000). 
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A set of phenomena indicative of schizophrenia demonstrates how 
the disorder causes some to lose their sense of ownership of their 
own mental or physical activity.  At different cycles of the progression 
or severity of schizophrenia, one could experience a lack of agency 
and autonomy, attributing thoughts and behaviors to an outside 
source.19  These symptoms include sensory hallucinations, primarily 
auditory; delusions influencing the interpretation of events or others’ 
behavior; and an experience of losing control over one’s own emo-
tions and thoughts.20 
As a psychosis involving the breakdown of a sense of reality, schi-
zophrenia is characterized by a lack of insight regarding the illness.  
Lacking insight means that a person with schizophrenia may fail to 
accept her illness or to understand that all or some of her symptoms 
are a consequence of the illness.21  Thus the lack of insight is not a 
denial of illness but a lack of awareness coupled with persistent disbe-
lief that the illness distorts reality.22  As a result of the lack of insight, a 
person may avoid, refuse or discontinue treatment.23 
 
 19 See id. at 572–73 (discussing the clinical symptoms of schizophrenia). 
 20 See id. at 573, 580 (listing the Schneiderian first-rank symptoms).  First-rank symptoms 
are:  (a) voices commenting:  auditory hallucinations of a voice commenting, usually in a 
negative and judgmental manner, on one’s actions; (b) voices discussing or arguing:  au-
ditory hallucinations of multiple voices discussing or arguing about oneself; (c) audible 
thought:  hearing one’s own thoughts as if spoken; (d) thought insertion:  experiencing 
thoughts as not of one’s own but rather inserted by an alien source; (e) thought with-
drawal:  the belief that an alien agency is removing thoughts from one’s mind; 
(f) thought broadcast:  experiencing thoughts as being broadcast to become available to 
others; (g) made will:  experiencing a loss of control over will, which becomes subject to 
alien influence; (h) made acts:  the belief that behavior are actions of an alien agency, ra-
ther than one’s own actions; (i) made affect:  emotion that is not one’s own but influence 
by outside source; (j) somatic passivity:  bodily functions controlled by alien forces; 
(k) delusional perception:  attributing unwarranted and unreasonable meanings to nor-
mal perception.  These phenomena, however, are not used as diagnostic tools.  Instead, a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia requires the existence of bizarre delusions and/or comment-
ing voices or voices conversing over an extended period of time; or the existence of at 
least two of the following symptoms:  delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech, 
grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior, or negative symptoms.  To conclude the diag-
nosis, other possible conditions such as brief mood disturbances or substance abuse must 
be excluded.  Symptoms must be present for at least a month.  Additionally, symptoms 
must exist for a significant portion of a month prior to the diagnosis along with six 
months of disturbance in social or occupational functions.  Id. 
 21 See id. at 574 (emphasizing that lack of insight is a defining characteristic of psychotic ill-
ness). 
 22 See Izutsu, supra note 15, at 1014 (“The inability or refusal to comply with treatment tends 
to lead to exacerbation of symptoms and coinciding disturbances in behavior.”). 
 23 See Liddle, supra note 18, at 574 (considering the role lack of insight has in refusing to 
accept treatment). 
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The expectancy rate for developing schizophrenia in the general 
population is around, or slightly lower than, 1%.24  Rates of schizo-
phrenia among men and women are practically the same.25  Addi-
tionally, there is no clear and conclusive evidence that symptoms are 
qualitatively different between sexes.  Whatever differences do exist, 
they are generally attributed to other male or female dissimilarities, 
such as brain development or social gender roles, rather than schizo-
phrenia itself.26 
Findings regarding the high rates of schizophrenia among family 
members suggest that genetics are a necessary, though insufficient, 
risk-factor for schizophrenia.  Additionally, the closer the family con-
nection—that is, the more common genes—the higher the risk of 
schizophrenia development.27  Other biological risk factors are factors 
that influence brain development such as pre- and perinatal dam-
age.28 
Besides biological factors, social or familial environments also may 
contribute to the development of schizophrenia.  Research suggests 
that underprivileged socio-economic status or ethnic minority status 
can be risk factors, as well as having been born and raised in an urban 
environment.29  Marital status, however, has a mitigating effect on 
schizophrenia.  Marriage can delay the onset of schizophrenia or cu-
shion its impact and severity of symptoms.30  These findings about the 
causes of schizophrenia are notable for two reasons.  First, the strong 
genetic connection between parents and children suggests that, to 
the extent removal of children is meant to prevent development of 
the child’s schizophrenia, it is unjustifiable.  Removing a child from 
her parent’s care does not control for the biological factors that con-
tribute to the development of schizophrenia.  Second, these findings 
about causation of schizophrenia reinforce the importance of family 
 
 24 See id. at 590 (“The frequently cited ‘rule of thumb’ estimate of disease expectancy for 
schizophrenia [is] at around 1 per cent . . . .”); Gallager, supra note 17, at 236 (“Ap-
proximately 1% to 2% of the U.S. population is schizophrenic.”). 
 25 See Liddle, supra note 18, at 590 (discussing the onset rates of men and women at differ-
ent ages).  But see Gallager, supra note 17, at 236 (citing evidence that perhaps men are 
1.5 times more likely to develop schizophrenia than women due to differences in diag-
nostic tools). 
 26 See Liddle, supra note 18, at 591 (considering the symptomatic differences between males 
and females diagnosed with schizophrenia). 
 27 See id. at 593 (discussing the role genetic risk can play in schizophrenia). 
 28 See id. at 593–94. 
 29 See id. at 595 (exploring the environmental factors relevant to the onset of schizophre-
nia). 
 30 See id. 
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preservation to persons with schizophrenia, because maintaining the 
family unit can help postpone or ease their suffering. 
The course of schizophrenia moves in cycles of psychotic episodes 
and partial or complete remissions.31  Although during the first ten 
years following initial onset one’s condition usually deteriorates, most 
will later experience stabilization and gradual improvement.32  But 
outcomes vary significantly and range from complete recovery to un-
remitting illness and deterioration of cognitive and mental func-
tions.33  According to long-term studies, as many as 50% of people 
with schizophrenia recover and lead productive and satisfying lives.34  
In other words, at different stages of schizophrenia some may very 
well be able to function and may be contributing members to society, 
including being valuable resources for their children. 
Different methods of treatment are effective.  For example, drug 
treatment, specifically anti-psychotics, mitigate symptoms, increase 
cognitive function, assist with modifying behavior and decrease resis-
tance to treatment.35  These medications help with the chemical im-
balance in the brain that seems to cause symptoms such as delusions 
and hallucinations.36  Effective psychosocial interventions are also 
available.  These interventions include psychodynamic therapy 
(though usually combined with anti-psychotic medications) or pro-
grams training self-management and social skills development focus-
ing on the individual’s own environment and needs.37  Family inter-
ventions, by contrast, focus on the family dynamics’ impact on the 
person suffering from schizophrenia.  They address the possible hos-
tility within the family and attempt to resolve negative or harmful dy-
 
 31 Specifically, five primary patterns for the course of schizophrenia have been identified:  
single psychotic episode followed by complete remission; single psychotic episode fol-
lowed by incomplete remission; at least two psychotic episodes with complete remission 
between episodes; at least two episodes with incomplete remission between them; and 
continuous psychotic illness.  See id. at 615. 
 32 See id. (explaining a three-stage classification of post-onset course for schizophrenia). 
 33 See id. at 619 (considering the extreme variances of relapses and partial remissions of per-
sons diagnosed with schizophrenia). 
 34 See Leighton Y. Huey et al., Families and Schizophrenia:  The View from Advocacy, 30 
PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 549, 559 (2007) (considering the ability of patients to recover 
from schizophrenia and lead productive lives). 
 35 See D.G. Cunningham & E.C. Johnstone, Treatment and Management of Schizophrenia, in 1 
NEW OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 18, at 621. 
 36 See Shari Lynne Kahn, Comment, The Right to Adequate Treatment Versus the Right to Refuse 
Antipsychotic Drug Treatment:  A Solution to the Dilemma of the Involuntarily Committed Psychiat-
ric Patient, 33 EMORY L. J. 441, 446 (1984) (explaining the role of antipsychotic drugs in 
the alleviation of symptoms). 
 37 See Cunningham & Johnstone, supra note 35, at 625–26 (considering various types of psy-
chotherapy available for schizophrenia). 
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namics by educating family members about schizophrenia and offer-
ing advice regarding coping with the illness.38 
Because of the wide variation in experiences of schizophrenia be-
tween different people, as well as the diversity in the types and inten-
sity of symptoms, considering all persons with schizophrenia as inca-
pable of a well-functioning life oversimplifies their condition.  
Further, it ignores the array of efficient interventions toward recov-
ery.  The result of essentializing the impact of schizophrenia on a 
person’s life is the risk of inadequate legal actions that are not suffi-
ciently nuanced to account for differences between people with schi-
zophrenia.  As an example of such shortcomings in the law, the re-
mainder of this Article focuses on the limited ability of current legal 
frameworks to reflect distinctions between parents who have lost their 
ability to parent their children because of schizophrenia, and other 
parents who remain fit parents despite the illness. 
B.  The Impact of Schizophrenia on Parenting 
Parents with severe mental illness, such as schizophrenia, are of-
ten considered by social science, the law and society at large to be in-
adequate parents who may cause grave harm to their children.39  This, 
however, may not always be the case for all parents with schizophre-
nia, although schizophrenia could impair parenting abilities in vari-
ous ways.  Symptoms may directly diminish parenting skills by limiting 
ability to read non-verbal cues or to navigate social interactions suc-
cessfully.40  Also, an altered sense of reality caused by symptoms such 
as delusions or hallucinations may result in neglect or abuse of a 
child;41 a parent distracted or preoccupied with a delusion or obses-
sion could withdraw from the child or become unavailable.42  Symp-
toms such as social withdrawal or irritability also hinder a parent’s re-
sponsiveness to her child, or her ability to express warmth or to be a 
nurturing parent.43  A parent’s capability to discipline a child ade-
 
 38 See id. at 625. 
 39 See Ackerson, supra note 4, at 187–88 (considering the role mental health literature has 
played in focusing on the negative aspects of parenting by people with serious mental ill-
ness). 
 40 See id. at 190. 
 41 See id. (“Parents with schizophrenia may have an impaired ability to read nonverbal cues 
or to engage in mutual social interchange and may present a greater risk of physical 
abuse as a result of hallucinations or delusions.”). 
 42 See Jacqueline Barnes & Alan Stein, Effects of Parental Psychiatric and Physical Illness on Child 
Development, in 2 NEW OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 18, at 1848, 1849. 
 43 See Corina Benjet et al., Evaluating the Parental Fitness of Psychiatrically Diagnosed Individuals:  
Advocating a Functional-Contextual Analysis of Parenting, 17 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 238, 242 (2003) 
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quately is compromised as well.44  Alternatively, the parent could in-
corporate the child in the delusion or obsession.45  However, these 
phenomena do not necessarily put a child in direct physical danger.  
It is important to note that overall, persons with schizophrenia are no 
more violent or dangerous than the rest of the population, unless the 
illness is coupled with other conditions or disorders, such as sub-
stance abuse.46 
Other challenges parents with schizophrenia may face are the so-
cial issues incidental to schizophrenia.47  Stigmatization leads to de-
creased educational or vocational opportunities, instability of rela-
tionships and unavailability of health care insurance.48  
Impoverishment and homelessness are also related to mental illness 
and are detrimental to family dynamics.49  Yet these are not factors 
that render a parent unfit, though they play a determinative role in 
the perception of a mentally ill parent’s fitness.  Misunderstanding 
the complexity of schizophrenia and its impact on parenting could 
lead to assumptions about parents with schizophrenia as unfit, inca-
pable or dangerous parents.  Perhaps because of these social chal-
lenges, many parents are reluctant to seek professional assistance in 
coping with parenting difficulties or with the impact of their illness 
on their children.50  Though one possible explanation could be the 
lack of insight about the illness itself and its detriment to parenting, 
the fact that parents may be fearful of turning to social services for 
support because that could trigger custody proceedings resulting in 
 
(discussing whether symptoms of parents with schizophrenia render them unfit parents 
below community standards). 
 44 See Joanne Nicholson et al., Focus on Women:  Mothers with Mental Illness:  I. The Competing 
Demands of Parenting and Living With Mental Illness, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 635, 636 
(1998), available at http://psychservices.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/full/49/5/
635 (last visited Feb. 16, 2010) (considering that mothers with mental illness have greater 
difficulty disciplining their children). 
 45 See Heather Dipple et al., The Experience of Motherhood in Women with Severe and Enduring 
Mental Illness, 37 SOC. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY, 336, 337 (2002) (giving 
an example of two women who believed they should kill their children). 
 46 See Izutsu, supra note 15, at 1018–19; see also Benjet et al., supra note 43, at 240 (finding 
that substance abuse was associated with a greater risk for violence than mental illness). 
 47 These social effects are not exclusive to schizophrenia.  Rather, they could be attached to 
mental illness more generally.  However, given the severity of the mental illness, people 
with schizophrenia are more likely to be affected by these social effects. 
 48 See Huey et al., supra note 34, at 554. 
 49 See Gallager, supra note 17, at 239 (finding that poverty has been shown to increase the 
risk of abuse for children by parents with mental disorders). 
 50 See Alisa Busch & Allison D. Redlich, Patients’ Perception of Possible Child Custody or Visitation 
Loss for Nonadherence to Psychiatric Treatment, 58 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 999, 999 (2007) 
(finding that for at least some parents, “stigma and fear of losing child custody resulted in 
delaying needed treatment”). 
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removal of children51 is also highly troubling.  The hardships of par-
enting are exacerbated by lack of assistance, and yet parents would 
rather struggle than get much needed help for fear of losing their 
children.52 
Despite the effects of schizophrenia on parenting abilities, many 
parents still manage to raise their children well.53  In fact, women with 
schizophrenia who maintain custody of their children function better 
than other women with severe mental illness, despite using the same 
mental health services.54  This finding is consistent with a different 
study that found that hospitalizations of women with schizophrenia 
were prolonged when these women had previously been separated 
from their children.  The study’s authors hypothesized that perhaps 
the separation had exacerbated schizophrenic symptoms.55  Because 
mothers tend to fare better when they have custody of their children, 
and because children may not actually be at risk, it should be in the 
interest of the state to prioritize family preservation. 
Another level of analyzing the effects of schizophrenia is examin-
ing the direct impact it has on the child herself and her own mental 
health.  A parent’s severe mental illness has the potential of com-
promising the stability of children’s lives.  The cyclicality of schizo-
phrenia could leave a child confused by behavior that swings from 
loving and nurturing to frightening and unstable.56  If a child be-
comes somewhat of a caregiver to the parent in a reversal of norma-
tive dependency roles, the child’s physical health could be at risk as 
well.57  Another concern is that children of parents with mental illness 
are prone to poor development, be it cognitive, emotional or social.58  
These children may exhibit social withdrawal, as well as academic and 
behavioral difficulties at school, irritability, stress, along with sleeping 
 
 51 Id. 
 52 As my argument progresses in Part I.C. infra, these concerns of parents seem justified.  
With statutes disadvantaging them as parents, it is very likely that once the state inter-
venes, whether through social services or the legal system, some form of family separation 
will occur. 
 53 See Barnes & Stein, supra note 42, at 1848. 
 54 See Ackerson, supra note 4, at 189 (citing a study of case management clients in Massachu-
setts).  Regardless of whether these women maintain custody of their children because 
they function better or the other way around, this finding challenges the correlation be-
tween severe mental illness and parental unfitness. 
 55 See Dipple et al., supra note 45, at 340. 
 56 See Huey et al., supra note 34, at 554. 
 57 See Benita Walton-Moss et al., Effects of Mental Illness on Family Quality of Life, 26 ISSUES 
MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 627, 629 (2005) (explaining that role reversals of dependency 
and care in families contributed to negative effects on the caregiver’s health). 
 58 See Barnes & Stein, supra note 42, at 1848. 
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and eating disorders.59  Because of social stigmatization of mental ill-
nesses, they are highly vulnerable to isolation, discrimination and ha-
rassment.60 
Children of parents with schizophrenia are also at a heightened 
risk of developing schizophrenia themselves, or other poor mental 
health conditions.61  For instance, children of parents with schizo-
phrenia demonstrate early attentional difficulties common to schizo-
phrenia that continue in adulthood and may later develop into 
schizophrenia.62  A child of a parent with schizophrenia has a 10% 
risk of developing schizophrenia.63  Even without becoming full-blown 
schizophrenia, attentional deficits may be predictive of associative 
thought disorders or future relationship problems.64 
That said, such concerns regarding the well-being of children of 
parents with schizophrenia do not materialize in all cases.  In fact, re-
search suggests that harms are exacerbated by separation from the 
parent.  Thus, the rates of mental illness among children not raised 
by their parents were somewhat higher than those among children 
who remained in their mothers’ custody.65  Being raised by a parent 
with schizophrenia, therefore, is not sufficient for the development of 
schizophrenia in the child.  Children can be resilient despite a par-
ent’s mental illness; a resilience attributed to different coping styles, 
intellectual abilities or social skills.66 
These positive findings regarding the effect of parents’ schizo-
phrenia on children, as well as findings about the health benefits of 
maintaining children’s custody and care to parents, lead to the con-
clusion that schizophrenia does not necessarily hinder parenting.  
Despite suffering from schizophrenia, parents are a valuable resource 
for their children.  In the next Part I examine whether the law re-
flects this conclusion or whether it views schizophrenia as incompati-
ble with parenting, suggesting therefore, that people suffering from 
 
 59 See generally id. at 1848–49. 
 60 See Amy Weir, An Introduction to the Issues:  A New Holistic Approach Outlined, in CHILD 
PROTECTION AND ADULT MENTAL HEALTH:  CONFLICT OF INTEREST? 1, 2 (Amy Weir & An-
thony Douglas eds., 1999) (maintaining that children of parents with mental illness can 
be vulnerable to bullying and social isolation as a result of negative remarks made about 
their parent’s behavior or characteristics). 
 61 See Barnes & Stein, supra note 42, at 1850. 
 62 See id. 
 63 See Gallager, supra note 17, at 236.  Though the precise level of contribution is not clear, 
both genetics and environmental factors make for this risk.  See also supra notes 27–30 and 
accompanying text about risk factors for the development of schizophrenia. 
 64 See Barnes & Stein, supra note 42, at 1850. 
 65 See id. 
 66 See id. at 1849. 
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schizophrenia should not be raising children.  My critiques of the law, 
primarily federal and Virginia law, center around their heightened 
burdens on parents with schizophrenia, the unavailability and inade-
quacy of services to these parents, the shortcomings of assessment of 
mental illness in legal contexts, the law’s assumption that mental ill-
ness is permanent and the overly narrow view of the child’s best in-
terest, all of which perpetuate family separation as the only legal re-
medy for children neglected or abused by parents with 
schizophrenia. 
C.  The Law of Mental Disability and Parenting:  Current Models of 
Intervention 
The law addresses parents with mental illness primarily in the con-
text of custody and termination of parental rights.  A mental illness 
alone is not ordinarily sufficient for removal of children from a par-
ent’s custody or termination of parental rights.  Rather, many juris-
dictions require a showing that the parent is unable to care for the 
child because of her mental illness.67  However, the law is constructed 
to burden parents with mental illness in maintaining or regaining 
custody and other parental rights over their children.  Presumptions 
of unfitness, the denial of social services, or the assumption that un-
fitness due to schizophrenia persists over time mean that both stat-
utes and courts stand in the way of family preservation.  I discuss be-
low the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), the federal statute 
most relevant to parents with mental illness.  After a general overview 
of state law, I move to focus on Virginia law as a more specific exam-
ple of how states create statutory frameworks that overly burden par-
ents with mental illness. 
1.  Federal Law—Adoption and Safe Families Act 
As termination of parental rights is a common prerequisite for 
adoption,68 the relevant federal statute is the Adoption and Safe Fami-
lies Act of 1997 (ASFA),69 despite not directly targeting parents with 
mental illness.  In an attempt to move children out of the foster care 
system, the Act guides states’ regulation of foster care, family reunifi-
cations, termination of parental rights and adoptions.  As such, its di-
 
 67 For a general discussion of removal and termination in state law, see infra Part I.C.2. 
 68 Not every case of adoption requires termination of parental rights.  Examples include 
step-parent adoptions or second-parent adoptions for same-sex couples. 
 69 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (pro-
moting and imposing safety requirements for the adoption of children in foster care). 
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rectives are the overarching principles to which state laws conform.  
ASFA’s financial incentives further ensure states’ compliance and 
prioritization of children’s release for adoption by severing ties with 
birth families. 
ASFA’s main guiding principle for states is guaranteeing the 
child’s health and safety.70  However, ASFA embodies a belief that this 
principle is best realized through adoption, rather than family pres-
ervation.71  According to ASFA, states should make reasonable efforts 
to maintain family integrity, but only as long as the child’s health or 
safety are not compromised.72  These efforts at family preservation oc-
cur at two points in time:  first, before foster placement, in order to 
prevent the child’s removal from home;73 second, after foster place-
ment to facilitate a child’s safe return to her parents.74  However, 
states are not obligated to make such reasonable efforts if a parent 
has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances,75 or if the par-
ent’s parental rights to a sibling were previously terminated.76 
It would seem, then, that the federal government prioritizes family 
preservation, as long as the child’s safety can be guaranteed.  How-
ever, the fact that states are not required in all instances to provide 
families with social services77 facilitates adoption of children because 
 
 70 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A) (2006). 
 71 See DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS:  THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 105 (2002). 
 72 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B). 
 73 Id. § 671(a)(15)(B)(i). 
 74 Id. § 671(a)(15)(B)(ii). 
 75 Id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i).  “Aggravated circumstances” are to be defined by state law and, 
according to ASFA, include but are not limited to abandonment, torture, chronic abuse 
and sexual abuse. 
 76 Id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(iii). 
 77 See infra Part I.C.3–4.  In some circumstances—previous termination of parental rights, 
for instance—states are not required to provide services.  It is unclear whether states can 
provide no services whatsoever; state courts generally agree that states are only required 
to provide reasonable services, rather than futile ones, which leaves services providers 
with much latitude when deciding whether and which services to provide.  Examples of 
court decisions to this effect include Mary Ellen C. v. Arizona Department of Economic Secu-
rity, 971 P.2d 1046, 1053 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (reversing the juvenile court’s severance 
order because the State failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that it made a 
reasonable effort to preserve the family); In re Sydney J., 2005 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2176, at 
*27 (June 13, 2005) (finding that the department met its burden by making reasonable 
efforts to reunify the mother with the children, even though the mother was unable or 
unwilling to benefit from the reunification efforts); In re Children of Vasquez, 658 N.W.2d 
249, 254–55 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that “reasonable efforts would be futile and 
unreasonable” where “appellant failed to comply with his parental duties when he mur-
dered his wife (the children’s mother) and then did not allow the children to attend 
their mother’s funeral”); In re Conley/Wilt Children, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 679, at *19–20 
(Feb. 6, 1998) (reversing the award of permanent custody to the department and re-
manding for further proceedings because the lower court had not determined “whether 
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parents are denied the assistance they need in order to do better.  It 
is puzzling why families are left unserved precisely when they face 
such “aggravated circumstances.”78  These families are in most need 
of services, but are denied the right to them. 
When services are to be provided to families, the standard of ser-
vices provision—i.e., “reasonable”—is unclear.  The standard’s va-
gueness enables far too easy termination of parental rights, as judges 
can avoid in depth review of the services.79  Judges may also exercise 
broad discretion over the type and scope of services that satisfy the 
standard.  As a result, courts find agencies that have provided very lit-
tle, or no, services as compliant, often because of a lack of funding or 
the unavailability of services.80  By not specifying mandatory services 
or providing guidelines as to which services are “reasonable,” ASFA 
effectively excuses agencies from providing any family preservation 
services at all.81  This, in turn, perpetuates the parent’s impaired care 
for her children and facilitates the termination of her parental rights 
and pursuant adoption of her children. 
Another reason to question the federal law’s efficacy in fostering 
family preservation is that the incentives ASFA puts in place for mov-
ing children out of foster care and releasing them for adoption create 
obstacles for family preservation.82  For each child adopted out of fos-
ter care (beyond a base number of children) a state is eligible for an 
additional $4,000 from the federal government.83  An eligible state is 
that which exceeds in a fiscal year its base number of adoptions.84  
 
the agency had made reasonable efforts through its case plans to reunite [the mother] 
with her children, nor did the court determine that efforts at reunification would have 
been futile”). 
 78 See ROBERTS, supra note 71, at 109 (“Most people would agree that children have an in-
terest in, if not a right to, government protection from this sort of violence.”). 
 79 See id. at 131 (discussing Suter v. Artist M, 503 U.S. 347 (1992), in which the U.S. Supreme 
Court rejected the right of foster children to bring a federal suit to enforce the reason-
able efforts provision against the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services be-
cause the provision was too ambiguous to enforce). 
 80 See id. at 132 (citing one guardian’s testimony before Congress). 
 81 See id. at 132–33 (discussing an investigation by the U.S. General Accounting Office into 
how a Florida county implemented the AFSA). 
 82 See 42 U.S.C. § 673b(a) (2006)(“[T]he Secretary shall make a grant to each State that is 
an incentive-eligible State for a fiscal year in an amount equal to the adoption incentive 
payment payable to the State under this section for the fiscal year, which shall be payable 
in the immediately succeeding fiscal year.”). 
 83 Id. § 673b(d)(1)(A).  Incentives for other adoptions, such as older child adoptions, may 
be of a different amount. 
 84 Id. §§ 673b(b)(2), (g)(3).  Two base numbers are in place.  The first concerns the num-
ber of foster children adoptions.  Here, the base number is the number of such adoptions 
in the state for the year 2007.  As for the base number of older children adoptions, that 
too is the number of such adoptions in the state during 2007.  However, the state is eligi-
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This system encourages states to continuously exceed the number of 
adoptions from one year to the next,85 but does not at all incentivize 
states to preserve families.  Consequently, states would understanda-
bly privilege adoptions over family preservation.86 
The Louisiana Supreme Court well articulated the relationship 
between ASFA and state law, stating:  “The ASFA tilts th[e] delicate 
balance [between the natural parent’s fundamental right and the 
child’s right to a permanent home] in the child’s favor and requires 
states, as a condition to continued receipt of certain federal funding, 
to enact parallel legislation.”87  As a result, states are often exempt 
from working with the family toward reunification, and the burden to 
prove parental fitness shifts to the parent who wishes to maintain her 
parental rights.88 
2.  State Law and Parents with Mental Disorders:  An Overview 
As a general matter, though specifics vary across jurisdictions, 
most states consider a parent’s mental disorder grounds for removal 
or termination of parental rights when that mental disorder results in 
the parent’s inability to care for her child.  Some states express this 
view in their statutory schemes.  These statutes explicitly state that a 
mental illness ought to be considered by courts in removal proceed-
ings if the mental illness renders a parent unable to care for the 
child.  Among these states are Arizona and Kansas.  Other states, 
however, do not have such statutes and regard a parent’s mental ill-
ness as reason for removal or termination as fitting the child’s best 
interest, as does the District of Columbia. 
One state where a parent’s mental illness is grounds for termina-
tion is Arizona.  This state’s statute instructs courts to terminate pa-
 
ble for additional funding if it exceeds its highest number of adoptions in the state in a 
single year since 2002.  To be clear, let us assume that State X has released 1000 children 
for adoption in 2007.  Let us assume further that since 2002 the most adoptions in that 
state in a single year have been 1500.  To qualify for a federal grant in 2009, State X 
would have to release more than 1000 children for adoption.  However, for a higher 
grant, State X would have to release more than 1500 children for adoption in 2009. 
 85 Continuing the illustrative calculations above:  assuming State X has indeed exceeded its 
base number in 2009 by releasing more than 1500 children for adoption (let us say the 
number of children adopted in State X in 2009 is 2000), the highest number of adoptions 
ever that qualifies State X for the increased grant in pursuant years will become 2000.  
Thus, in order to maximize funding, states are incentivized to continually increase the 
number of adoptions.  ROBERTS, supra note 71, at 111. 
 86 See id. 
 87 State ex rel. SNW v. Mitchell, No. 01-2128, 2001 La. LEXIS 3105, at *14 (Nov. 28, 2001). 
 88 Id. at *14–22. 
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rental rights of a mentally ill or deficient parent, if the parent is un-
able to perform parental responsibilities and if that inability is likely 
to persist over an indeterminate period of time.89  An Arizona court 
has interpreted this statute as mandatory; when clear and convincing 
evidence exists that a parent does in fact have a mental illness, that 
the parent cannot care for the child because of the mental illness and 
that this inability to care is persistent over time, the court has no dis-
cretion and must terminate the child-parent relationship.90 
Similarly to the Arizona statute, Kansas too has instructed courts 
through its law to consider a parent’s mental illness as a factor in 
terminations of parental rights.91  Here, the mental illness must be of 
such nature or duration that it would eliminate the parent’s ability to 
care for the child’s physical, mental and emotional needs,92 and the 
situation must be one that is unlikely to change in the foreseeable fu-
ture.93  Indeed, mental illness alone cannot satisfy the conditions for 
terminations.  In In re J.Y.,94 the Kansas Court of Appeals reaffirmed 
the lower court’s termination of the father’s rights.  Rather than the 
father’s mental illness, the court of appeals based its decision on the 
father’s criminal record, his failure to comply with rehabilitation ef-
forts and his failure to care for the child.  The court reasoned that 
the state provided no evidence to support a claim that the father’s bi-
polar disorder had any effect on his parenting ability.95 
The District of Columbia’s statutory scheme provides that termi-
nation decisions are made on the basis of the child’s best interests,96 
 
 89 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533(B)(3) (2009). 
 90 In re Appeal in Pinal County, 729 P.2d 918, 920 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). 
 91 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2269(b)(1) (2008). 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. § 38-2269(a). 
 94 191 P.3d 1137, No. 100,214, 2008 WL 4239122 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008). 
 95 Id. at *2 (“The court provided no reasoning for choosing this factor, merely stating the 
natural father had been incapable of caring for J.Y.  While the record contained evidence 
the natural father had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder as a juvenile, no evidence 
provided by the State demonstrated the effect this disorder might have on the natural fa-
ther’s ability to parent or the persistence of the natural father’s disability.  Consequently, 
the evidence does not support a finding the natural father currently possesses an emo-
tional or mental illness or disability that renders him incapable of parenting J.Y.”). 
 96 D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2353 (2001).  The District of Columbia statute’s language reads: 
(b) In determining whether it is in the child’s best interests that the parent and 
child relationship be terminated, a judge shall consider each of the following fac-
tors:  (1) the child’s need for continuity of care and caretakers and for timely inte-
gration into a stable and permanent home, taking into account the differences in 
the development and the concept of time of children of different ages; (2) the 
physical, mental and emotional health of all individuals involved to the degree 
that such affects the welfare of the child, the decisive consideration being the 
physical, mental and emotional needs of the child; (3) the quality of the interac-
tion and interrelationship of the child with his or her parent, siblings, relative, 
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without specifically regarding parental mental illness as a factor.  
While courts agree that mental illness in itself is not grounds for ter-
mination of parental rights, it is a consideration when the illness im-
pacts the child’s well-being.  In E.C. v. District of Columbia,97 the D.C. 
Court of Appeals affirmed a termination of the parents’ rights using 
the best interest framework.  In this case, based on testimonies from 
psychiatrists, social workers and family members, the court found that 
the parents’, particularly the father’s,98 mental condition had a poten-
tial adverse effect on the three young children.99  The court con-
cluded that the father was both emotionally and physically dangerous 
to his children for two reasons.  First, his disorder could cause irre-
versible emotional damage to the children who already suffered de-
velopmental impairments.  Second, the court was concerned with the 
lack of attachments between the parents and the children, which was 
so severe that the children exhibited distress and behavioral prob-
lems after visits with the parents, including self-injurious behavior.100 
Another state that adopts a framework similar to the best interest 
model is Louisiana.101  Although the Louisiana statute does not explic-
itly use the term “child’s best interest,” its language effectively creates 
such a standard by prescribing that courts consider in their termina-
tion decisions the child’s age and “need for a safe, stable, and per-
manent home.”102 
To summarize, states generally require termination of parental 
rights on three basic necessary conditions:  (a) a parent’s mental ill-
ness; (b) a parent’s inability to care for her child; (c) causality be-
 
and/or caretakers, including the foster parent; (3A) the child was left by his or her 
parent, guardian, or custodian in a hospital located in the District of Columbia for 
at least 10 calendar days following the birth of the child, despite a medical deter-
mination that the child was ready for discharge from the hospital, and the parent, 
guardian, or custodian of the child has not taken any action or made any effort to 
maintain a parental, guardianship, or custodial relationship or contact with the 
child; (4) to the extent feasible, the child’s opinion of his or her own best interests 
in the matter; and (5) evidence that drug-related activity continues to exist in a 
child’s home environment after intervention and services have been pro-
vided . . . . Evidence of continued drug-activity shall be given great weight. 
 97 589 A.2d 1245, 1249 (D.C. 1991). 
 98 Id. at 1247 (discussing the father’s mental state, the court cited a psychiatrist who found 
the father suffered from a “character disorder which caused him to view everyone around 
him with deep suspicion and to deny any personal responsibility for events in his life, and 
hindered his ability to have any insight into his problems”).  The court also referred to a 
counseling psychologist who testified that the father’s disorder manifested in his inability 
to organize his life and to meet his responsibilities.  Id. at n.5. 
 99 Id. at 1250. 
100 Id. at 1247–49. 
101 See LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1015 (2008). 
102 Id. at art. 1015(5). 
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tween the illness and the inability to care.  However, other common 
considerations for termination are the parent’s prospects at im-
provement and recovery and the child best interest model.  In Sub-
parts C.iii and C.iv.1–3 below, I discuss in greater detail how these 
conditions work to disadvantage parents with mental disorders.  In 
Virginia, the jurisdiction on which I focus hereafter, once condition 
(a) applies, there is a presumption that conditions (b) and (c) exist 
as well.  This presumption increases the risk that parents will lose cus-
tody of their children, which is an infringement on their fundamental 
rights.  Virginia, therefore, is both representative of most states’ 
treatment of parents with mental disorders and an example that 
highlights how state law overly burdens such parents. 
3.  Virginia Law—Obstacles to Family Preservation 
The State of Virginia intervenes in families when a child is abused 
or neglected.103  Defining abuse or neglect, Virginia law stipulates that 
a child left without parental care because of a parent’s mental inca-
pacity is a neglected child.104  When there is concern that a child has 
been neglected or abused, a social services agency may remove the 
child immediately from her home and petition, within four hours, for 
a court issued emergency removal order.105  For a court to grant an 
order, the petition must establish that returning the child home 
would likely place the child in imminent danger of life or of severe or 
irreversible injury.106  Additionally, the petition must show that rea-
sonable efforts to prevent removal have been made, and that there 
was no less drastic alternative to removal that would ensure the rea-
sonable protection of the child.107  When there is no reasonable op-
portunity to provide these or other services, it is assumed that reason-
able efforts to prevent removal have been made.108 
 
103 Virginia law defines an abused or neglected child as a child whose parent or caretaker 
inflicts, threatens to inflict or facilitates non-accidental mental or physical harm, substan-
tial risk of death, disfigurement or impairment of bodily or mental functions; neglects or 
refuses to provide care necessary for the child’s health; abandons the child; commits or 
allows unlawful sexual acts upon the child; leaves the child with a registered violent sex 
offender; or a child left without parental care.  See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228(1)–(6) 
(2009). 
104 See id. § 16.1-228(5). 
105 See id. § 16.1-251(A). 
106 See id. § 16.1-251(A)(1). 
107 See id. § 16.1-251(A)(2).  The statute suggests less drastic alternatives such as “medical, 
educational, psychiatric, psychological, homemaking or other similar services to the child 
or family.” 
108 See id. § 16.1-251(A)(2). 
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Once a child is placed in the custody of social services or a child 
welfare agency, and unless the child has been returned to the custody 
of her parents, the department of social services must design a foster 
care plan.109  After approving a foster care plan, courts must review 
the plan at least twice.110 
Just as ASFA directs, Virginia too requires the child’s health and 
safety to be the highest priority for the agency devising a foster care 
plan and for the court reviewing and approving it.111  Also, like ASFA, 
Virginia requires that the plan support reasonable efforts to return 
the child to her parents within the shortest feasible amount of time, 
providing that reunification is consistent with the child’s health and 
safety.112  However, the agency is not required to make reasonable ef-
forts to reunite the child with her parent if the parent has previously 
lost parental rights over a sibling or if the parent has been convicted 
of other crimes—generally different types of homicide or violent 
crimes against children.113 
The court may terminate parental rights when a child has been 
abused or neglected and has been placed in foster care if termination 
is in the best interest of the child.114  Before looking into the child’s 
best interest, however, threshold conditions must be met:  that the 
abuse or neglect must have seriously and substantially threatened the 
child’s life, health or development;115 and that it is not reasonably 
likely that the abuse or neglect would have ended, therefore ensuring 
the child’s safe return home in reasonable time.116 
 
109 See id. § 16.1-281(A).  The agency should involve the parent and child—provided that the 
child’s involvement is in her best interest—and has sixty days (and in some circumstances 
an additional sixty days) for designing the plan.  The plan should specify:  (a) the pro-
grams, care, services and other support to the child and parents; (b) the participation 
and conduct required from the parents; (c) the permitted visitations or other contacts 
between the child and parents; (d) the nature of the child’s placement; and (e) if the 
child is 16 or over, programs and services to help the child prepare for independent liv-
ing.  Id. § 16.1-281(B). 
110 A court is to hold a hearing in order to review and approve a plan within seventy-five days.  
At this hearing, a judge has the authority to revise a foster care plan.  See id. § 16.1-281(C).  
Following approval of a plan, the court is to schedule another review hearing in six 
months, unless the effects and results of the plan are equivalent to those of termination 
of parental rights, in which case the court is to schedule a review hearing in twelve 
months.  See id. § 16.1-281(E). 
111 See id. § 16.1-281(B). 
112 See id. 
113 See id. 
114 See id. § 16.1-283(B). 
115 See id. § 16.1-283(B)(1). 
116 See id. § 16.1-283(B)(2). 
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Most important for our purposes, the law creates a presumption 
that a parent’s mental illness excludes the likelihood of a child’s safe 
return home into the custody of her parents.  The presumption exists 
when a parent has a mental illness that is severe enough to eliminate 
a reasonable expectation for a parent’s ability to care for the child in 
a manner appropriate with the child’s age and developmental 
stage.117 
This statutory framework disadvantages parents with mental illness 
in several ways.  First, by making an explicit connection between a 
parent’s mental incapacity and neglect, the statute lowers the general 
standard of neglect. When a parent has no mental illness, an agency 
must show that the child has been, or is currently, at risk of harm or 
death, or that the child is without care that is necessary for her 
health.118  Yet, when the parent has a mental illness no such showing 
is required; instead it is sufficient that a child is without parental 
care119 regardless of whether the lack of care places the child in risk 
or if the absent care is necessary for her health.  Thus, when a child 
has a parent with a mental illness, the threshold for a court finding 
that the child has been neglected is lower.  Rather than turning on 
the harm to the child, the standard—which is no longer neutral—
now turns on the parent’s mental capacity. 
While the statute itself creates a disparate standard, courts have 
further exacerbated this disparity.  In Jenkins v. Winchester Department 
of Social Services,120 a mother with paranoid-schizophrenia, who had 
her parental rights over three older children terminated, appealed 
the termination of parental rights to a younger boy and girl.  Contest-
ing the termination of her rights regarding her daughter, who was 
removed immediately after birth,121 Jenkins argued that as the child 
was removed so early, there was no actual finding of abuse or neglect.  
Therefore, Jenkins argued, her rights should not have been termi-
nated.  The court found Jenkins’s illness rendered her incapable of 
being an independent parent122 and therefore posed a substantial risk 
to her children.  The court interpreted “substantial risk” as relating to 
a future possibility that indeed may not materialize.123  Thus, based on 
 
117 See id. § 16.1-283(B)(2)(a). 
118 See id. § 16.1-228(1)–(6). 
119 See id. § 16.1-228(5). 
120 409 S.E.2d 16 (Va. Ct. App. 1991). 
121 Id. at 17. 
122 Id. at 18–19.  The court did not specify what it meant by “independent parent,” but seems 
to imply that an independent parent is one who does not require constant and frequent 
supervision or assistance from others, particularly from the Department of Social Services. 
123 Id. 
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her mental illness, the court presumed that Jenkins could not care 
for her daughter.124  Furthermore, the court presumed that she even-
tually would present a risk because the court did not believe there was 
a reasonable possibility that Jenkins’ parenting would improve. 
Thus, not only does the court assume that a parent is unfit be-
cause of a mental illness, but it also subjects a parent who suffers from 
a mental illness to a higher standard of parenting than it does men-
tally healthy parents.125  In regards to her son, Jenkins argued that, 
pursuant to her participation in social services, her parenting abilities 
had improved enough that she no longer presented a substantial risk 
to him.126  However, the court ruled this was insufficient, and despite 
the progress she had made,127 Jenkins would have to show that she 
could function as an independent parent if she were to reverse a ter-
mination decision and regain custody.128  Notably, this “independent 
parent” standard is a standard that has no root in the language of the 
statute.  Moreover, being an “independent parent” is not expected of 
mentally healthy parents.  Arguably, other parents are encouraged to 
share parental responsibilities with their extended families and com-
munities rather than shoulder the burdens of parenting on their 
own.  The result is that the standard for the state to remove a child is 
lower, yet the standard for a parent to regain rights is elevated.  A 
child of a parent with a mental illness, then, is more likely to be re-
moved from her home and a parent’s custody, and less likely to be 
reunited with that parent. 
A second way in which Virginia law hinders mentally ill parents is 
by limiting reunification services.  As a way to comply with ASFA,129 
Virginia law excuses a social services agency from making reasonable 
efforts at reunification when a parent’s parental rights to a sibling 
 
124 Id. at 19 (“Ms. Jenkins’ mental incapacity prevented her from rendering appropriate pa-
rental care.”).  For another example of a case where the court concludes that a mental 
illness means a parent is unfit, see Marston v. Fairfax County Department of Family Services, 
No. 1336-01-4, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 26 (Jan. 22, 2002). 
125 See Ackerson, supra note 4, at 190 (“[M]any judges apply a higher standard of parental 
competence that is more appropriate for divorce custody cases than for termination of 
parental rights.”). 
126 Jenkins, 409 S.E.2d at 20. 
127 Note that when discussing her daughter, the court maintained that there was no evidence 
of improvement in Jenkins’s parenting skills. 
128 Id. 
129 See Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 616 S.E.2d 765, 772 (Va. Ct. App. 2005) (point-
ing out the provision regarding reasonable services has been amended to conform to the 
federal statute). 
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have been previously terminated.130  Given the high rate of termina-
tion of rights of parents with mental illness, this allows agencies not 
to provide services to parents with mental illness.  A case in point is 
Toms v. Hanover Department of Social Services,131 where the court re-
viewed a lower court’s decision to terminate a father’s parental rights 
over his severely neglected and underdeveloped children.  The fa-
ther, diagnosed with multiple severe mental health problems,132 ar-
gued that the state could not terminate his parental rights because he 
was not provided with reasonable services.133  The court analyzed the 
language regarding reasonable services and concluded that the state 
had discretion—not an obligation—to provide services even when the 
law does not explicitly release the state from its responsibility to pro-
vide services.134  Addressing the issue of parental mental health, the 
court found that “another example of prima facie evidence (severe 
‘mental or emotional illness’) . . . includes no mention of rehabilita-
tive services, [therefore] it cannot be reasonably asserted that the 
subsection necessarily requires them in all cases.”135 
This ruling by the court is troubling for two reasons.  First, by re-
leasing agencies from the obligation to provide services to those par-
ents who are presumably most in need of such services, the law once 
more increases the risk that children will remain separated from their 
parents and that these parents’ rights will eventually be terminated.  
This raises concerns that the denial of services to parents who are 
mentally ill could ultimately reproduce their unfitness and failure as 
parents.  Second, courts that are required to evaluate a parent’s abil-
ity to remedy the abuse, neglect or unfitness are without means to 
make such judgments.  Absent these services and the opportunity to 
demonstrate to the court that services are both beneficial to parents 
and protective to the child, or that the abuse or neglect has ended in 
a way that will facilitate the child’s safe return home in reasonable 
time (as the termination provision suggests),136 parents are denied the 
 
130 VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-281(B) (2008).  This was also one of the court’s findings in Jenkins, 
that because she had lost custody over her older children, she presented a risk to her 
younger children.  Jenkins, 409 S.E.2d at 21. 
131 616 S.E.2d 765 (2005). 
132 Id. at 768.  Psychological testing revealed that Toms suffered from episodes of delusional 
thinking, social phobias, paranoia, severe anxiety, obsessive-compulsive disorder, depres-
sion and avoidant personality features.  He also acknowledged that he suffered from al-
cohol abuse.  Some of these have symptoms common to schizophrenia, such as the delu-
sions and paranoia. 
133 Id. at 767. 
134 Id. at 770–71. 
135 Id. at 771 n.4. 
136 VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(B)(2) (2008). 
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opportunity for a less drastic alternative to removal and termination.  
Nor do parents have the chance to avoid separation from their chil-
dren altogether.  Moreover, services enable both caseworkers and 
courts to evaluate different factors that could implicate the child’s 
best interest, her ability to cope with the separation, to address any 
special needs the child may have and to estimate whether in fact the 
child is likely to be adopted if parental rights are terminated.137  As I 
will argue in the following Parts, this is inconsistent with parents’ and 
children’s substantive due process rights, as it creates a heightened 
risk that a child removed from her parent’s custody will remain sepa-
rated from the home when removal progresses to termination of pa-
rental rights. 
The third and most detrimental way the law compromises the pa-
rental rights of parents with mental illness is the presumption that a 
parent’s mental illness diminishes the likelihood of a child’s safe re-
turn home.138  The presumption becomes almost unrebuttable when 
courts find that a diagnosis alone is sufficient to deem a parent un-
fit.139  As demonstrated in Jenkins, this presumption creates a default 
that a parent with mental illness should not retain her parental rights 
since because of her illness—and her illness alone—she cannot, and 
will not in the future be able to care for her child.  In another case, 
Helen W. v. Fairfax County Department of Human Development,140 the 
court ruled that the parents’ mental illness (both parents shared a 
common system of paranoid delusions) and their poor prognosis 
were sufficient for a finding of unfitness.141  In ruling so, the court 
held that a finding regarding a mental illness and a poor prognosis 
was “tantamount to a finding of parental unfitness and [that] no sep-
arate finding of unfitness was necessary.”142  Thus, not only is the state 
agency exempt from showing that the rights of a parent with mental 
illness should be terminated, but this presumption places the burden 
on the parent to show that those rights should not be terminated.  
What’s more, the state leaves the parent without resources to demon-
strate that her rights should not be terminated because she had been 
 
137 See Nina Wasow, Planned Failure:  California’s Denial of Reunification Services to Parents with 
Mental Disabilities, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 183, 218–19 (2006) (discussing the 
“reasonable efforts” phase of dependency proceedings). 
138 VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(B)(2)(a). 
139 See Wasow, supra note 137, at 221 (“Many judges, in denying services or terminating 
rights, simply point to the diagnosis as if it were evidence enough of inability to par-
ent . . . .”). 
140 407 S.E.2d 25 (Va. Ct. App. 1991). 
141 Id. at 29–30. 
142 Id. at 30. 
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previously denied access to services which could have served as a less 
restrictive alternative to removal, or could have enabled her to be-
come a fit parent. 
4.  The Inadequacy of Current Interventions 
Beyond the previously discussed shortcomings of the federal and 
Virginia frameworks, these interventions also are inadequate because 
they fail to properly address the particular circumstances of parents 
with mental illness.  First, while removal, reunification and termina-
tion revolve around mental illness and its impact on the parent’s fit-
ness, the law does not address how mental illness is to be assessed.  
Presumably, assessment is the role of social science professionals in 
their service to the courts, yet social science too struggles with the 
problem of assessment in legal contexts.143 
Second, as much as the law attaches parental mental illness to pa-
rental unfitness, it also conflates severity of mental illness with per-
manency.  Once a court finds a parent unfit merely because of that 
parent’s mental illness, the court is also more likely to conclude 
(sometimes with no in-depth scrutiny) that the illness is chronic,144 
and the parent, therefore, permanently unfit.  A poor prognosis of 
the parent’s improvement justifies, in the eyes of the court, the ter-
mination of parental rights. 
Lastly, both in statute and in court implementation, there seems 
to be an assumption that a child’s best interest is to be separated 
from a mentally ill parent that is abusive or neglectful.  Here, too, so-
cial science research, as well as the conditions of child welfare, raise 
hard questions as to whether a child’s best interest points to family 
separation and out of home care. 
a.  Assessing Parental Fitness 
Parenting skills, or parental fitness, are subject to the law’s scru-
tiny primarily when disputes between parents or disputes between 
parents and the state arise.  Relevant here are challenges brought by 
the state—upon moving for removal or termination of parental 
rights—to the parental fitness of a parent with schizophrenia.  Yet so-
cial scientists have challenged the adequacy of evaluations of parental 
fitness upon which courts rely, arguing that parents with mental ill-
 
143 See infra Part C.4.a. 
144 See infra note 166 and accompanying text. 
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ness lose their children due to inadequate and inappropriate assess-
ments.145 
The problems with assessment stem from the tools social services 
use to identify mental illness and parental fitness.  Because there are 
no formal guidelines or standards for assessment of parental mental 
illness,146 some of these tools, specifically personality tests, are inap-
propriate for assessing fitness,147 while others do not test parenting 
skills at all.148  The efficacy of these tools in determining fitness re-
mains insufficiently tested.149 
Assessments of parental fitness may also reflect assessors’ bias to-
ward individual parents, for which the inadequate tools are unable to 
control.  While mental health professionals conducting assessments 
tend to predict poor prognoses, the actual outcomes of treatment are 
more positive, thus inconsistent with the prognosis.150  Also, it seems 
that low socio-economic status is predictive of severe diagnoses and 
poor prognoses.151  This is a bias that reproduces the disadvantages to 
parents with mental health problems as well as parents from low so-
cio-economic backgrounds and particularly those at the intersection.  
Finally, out of concern to children’s safety and well-being, assessors 
tend to over-estimate the risk a parent may present in a preference to 
err on the safe side.152 
Still, however deficient assessment tools may be, they are prefer-
able to a complete lack of assessment, as was the case in Datta v. Fair-
fax Department of Family Services.153  There, Datta appealed the Virginia 
 
145 See Ackerson, supra note 4, at 190 (“[M]any mentally ill parents risk loss of their parental 
rights on the basis of inadequate or inappropriate assessment methods and professional 
bias.”). 
146 See Busch & Redlich, supra note 50, at 999 (“There are no formal practice standards to 
assess parental mental health or parental fitness . . . .”). 
147 See Ackerson, supra note 4, at 190 (“[P]rofessionals and judges continue to rely on per-
sonality tests and other assessment tools that may be inappropriate for this population in 
determining parenting competence.”). 
148 See Wasow, supra note 137, at 211 (discussing the flaws in psychological assessment of pa-
rental adequacy and child mistreatment risk). 
149 See Ackerson, supra note 4, at 190 (“Psychological instruments that are typically used for 
child welfare assessments have received little empirical testing regarding their efficacy for 
measuring parenting competence.”). 
150 See Wasow, supra note 137, at 212 (discussing a study conducted by attorney Bruce Ennis 
and psychologist Thomas Litwack which found a poor correlation between prognosis and 
actual outcome of treatment). 
151 See id. (“[P]erceived lower socio-economic status correlates directly with more severe di-
agnosis and poorer prognosis . . . .”). 
152 See id. (“[P]sychologists have a significant tendency towards over-prediction of violent be-
havior in civil commitments, which is a problem in child welfare cases.” (citation omit-
ted)). 
153 No. 0293-06-4, 2006 Va. App. LEXIS 394 (Aug. 22, 2006). 
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circuit court’s decision to remove her son, arguing the court erred in 
finding she had a “mental incapacity.”154  Neither the circuit court nor 
the court of appeals based their rulings on a mental health assess-
ment conducted by a mental health professional.  Rather, both courts 
based their findings on witnesses’ descriptions of the mother’s behav-
ior, as well as her medical history.155  Therefore, the court of appeals 
ruled that the circuit court did not err in concluding Datta had a 
mental incapacity.156 
This finding of Datta’s mental incapacity rests on shaky ground 
for two reasons.  For one, according to social science research, be-
cause of the inadequacy of assessment tools, caseworkers find it diffi-
cult to identify who is mentally ill or an unfit parent due to mental 
health problems.157  Second, even a history of psychiatric treatment 
can be misleading.  Keeping in mind that the course of mental illness 
varies significantly among patients, includes periods of remission and 
can, in some cases, lead to complete recovery,158 relying only on med-
ical history with no inquiry into the individual’s current mental health 
is insufficient.  In the context of removal of children from their par-
ents’ custody—a burden on a fundamental right159—a finding of men-
tal illness without proper assessment is highly troubling. 
Even when a mental illness has been correctly identified, it is a 
poor proxy for unfitness.  A series of studies suggest that parental fit-
ness hinges on many factors, less than on the diagnosis itself.160  These 
factors range from a parent’s intellectual and social competence, 
parenting practices and the severity of symptoms.161  Courts should 
therefore examine the actual parenting style, the particular symptoms 
a parent experiences, and their impact on the child and on parenting 
 
154 Id. at *2. 
155 Id. at *10 (“No witness opined that Datta was suffering from a particular mental disease.  
Rather, the witnesses described her attitude toward others and her uncommon behav-
ior. . . . Datta believed she was being followed or she spoke to persons who were not pre-
sent.  She exhibited aggressive behavior, which included threatening [the child’s] family 
and social workers. . . . [She] had a history of mental hospitalization and she took psychi-
atric medications . . . .”). 
156 Id. 
157 See Ackerson, supra note 4, at 189 (citing a study that found that “child welfare workers 
perceived themselves ill equipped to deal with assessment and treatment of the mentally 
ill parents they serve”). 
158 See Assen Jablensky, Course and Outcome of Schizophrenia, in 1 NEW OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF 
PSYCHIATRY, supra note 18, at 612, 619 (“[S]chizophrenia presents a broad spectrum of 
possible outcomes and course patterns . . . .”). 
159 For a discussion of parents’ custody rights, as well as family integrity, as fundamental 
rights, see Part II. 
160 See Ackerson, supra note 4, at 190 (listing such studies). 
161 See id. 
Mar. 2010] DUE PROCESS THROUGH COMPREHENSIVE CARE 813 
 
skills, rather than rely only on the diagnosis itself.  In light of these 
studies, it seems that the ruling in Datta was not in fact incorrect, be-
cause a particular diagnosis seems immaterial.  Had the court ana-
lyzed the impact of Datta’s mental incapacity or her actual parental 
fitness, perhaps this argument would have merit.  The court, how-
ever, merely presented facts it saw as demonstrative of Datta’s unfit-
ness—it did not address whether there existed a causal connection 
between Datta’s mental incapacity and her supposed inability to pro-
vide appropriate mental care for her son.162 
b.  Assuming Permanency:  Requiring a ‘Poor Prognosis’ 
As part of a termination of parental rights proceeding, Virginia 
courts examine the parent’s prognosis for recovery.  A decision to 
terminate must be based on the court’s finding that prospects for im-
provement are poor, and that as a result, the abuse or neglect are un-
likely to be remedied in a reasonable time.163  This “poor prognosis” 
requirement is rooted in a view that severe mental illness is chronic 
and immutable and that, as such, mental illness permanently pre-
cludes one from being a competent parent.164  The “poor prognosis” 
requirement highlights the lack of understanding among lawmakers 
and courts about the nature of mental illness, specifically recovery or 
remission prospects.  Although individuals may recover even from se-
vere mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia, or at least experience 
periods of remission,165 the existence of a mental illness in itself 
serves, again, as a proxy—this time for little chances of future mental 
health. 
For example, in Hayes v. Petersburg Department of Social Services,166 
parental rights were terminated despite the fact that the father, suf-
fering from schizophrenia, had been receiving rehabilitative services 
and therapy, though the father had sought out services later than 
proscribed in the foster care plan.167  The court held that despite the 
father receiving services, it was not in the child’s best interest to have 
to wait a long period of time to “find out when, or even if, a parent 
 
162 Datta v. Fairfax Dep’t of Family Servs., No. 0293-06-4, 2006 Va. App. LEXIS 394, at *10 
(Aug. 22, 2006). 
163 See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283 (B)(2)(a) (2008). 
164 See Ackerson, supra note 4, at 188 (describing how researchers view a parent’s mental dis-
order as “an immutable problem that inevitably undermines the ability to be an effective 
parent”). 
165 See Jablensky, supra note 158, at 619. 
166 No. 1166-05-2, 2005 Va. App. LEXIS 431 (Nov. 1, 2005). 
167 Id. at *8. 
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will be capable of resuming his [] responsibilities.”168  In light of the 
purpose of the foster care system as a temporary, yet oftentimes pro-
longed, solution for children whose parents are unable to care for 
them,169 the logic flowing from this ruling is puzzling.  If it is not in 
the best interest of children to wait for their parents to be able to 
parent them again, why the need for foster care as an intermediate 
period of time until adoption?  What’s more, a parent’s capability to 
parent is contingent upon the services she receives while her child is 
in foster care, yet these services take time to be effective in achieving 
remission or recovery.  Why, then, provide these services, which ar-
guably are a strain on public resources?  If, according to the court, 
children should not have to wait for their parents to become fit par-
ents, it would follow that every child removed from her unfit parents 
should be released for adoption immediately.  This ruling is highly 
under-protective of both parents’ rights to the custody of their chil-
dren and their interest in receiving mental health services, as well as 
children’s right to family integrity. 
c.  Determining the Child’s Best Interest 
In most matters of family law concerning children, the law in-
structs courts to consider the best interest of the child.  This is true 
also regarding removal of children or termination of parental rights.  
Indeed, both ASFA and Virginia law emphasize the child’s best inter-
est as a guiding principle.170  However, the “best interest of the child” 
is an individualized, context-based standard that scholars have criti-
cized for being too vague.171  Perhaps, then, a different concept is in 
order.  While one would be hard pressed to contest that protection 
from abuse or neglect is inconsistent with the child’s best interest, 
this should not be the only set of circumstances taken into account.  
 
168 Id. at *9 (quoting Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 
(Va. Ct. App. 1990)). 
169 See Cristina Chi-Young Chou, Renewing the Good Intentions of Foster Care:  Enforcement of the 
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 and the Substantive Due Process Right to Safety, 
46 VAND. L. REV. 683, 683 (1993) (“The purpose of foster care is to provide a temporary 
safe haven for children whose parents are unable to care for them.”). 
170 ASFA prioritizes the child’s “health and safety.”  42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (2006).  Virginia 
law considers the child’s best interest both in designing a foster plan, see VA. CODE ANN. § 
16.1-281(B) (2009), and in termination of parental rights, see id. § 16.1-283 (B). 
171 See Virginia Sawyer Radding, Intention v. Implementation:  Are Many Children, Removed from 
Their Biological Families, Being Protected or Deprived?, 6 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 29, 35–
36 (2001) (discussing how some scholars believe the “best interests of the child” standard 
is vague due to nonexistent guiding criterion and because its application is “vulnerable to 
biases”). 
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Rather, I propose a wider view of the standard that examines not only 
the child’s home life, but the impact of removal or termination and 
the legal proceedings which they involve, as well as the conditions 
and effects of foster care. 
When parents with mental illness are concerned, an inquiry into 
the child’s best interest often involves a discussion of the parent’s 
condition,172 and how that condition relates to the child.  But a find-
ing of a parent’s mental illness does not necessarily compromise the 
child’s best interest.  In fact, research regarding the harms of paren-
tal schizophrenia on children reveals that the likelihood and severity 
of attention deficits or thought disorders, common in children of 
parents with schizophrenia, worsen with separation from the parent.  
Similarly, mental illness rates among children not raised by their par-
ents are higher than those among children who remained in their 
mothers’ custody.173 
Separation from parents further implicates the child’s best inter-
est because it loosens—even breaks—the ties of attachment.  Accord-
ing to attachment theory, children’s bonds with a primary care-giver 
are necessary for healthy psychological development.174  Through an 
ongoing, long-term relationship with parents, children learn how to 
face the world and forge their own identity by either imitating or re-
jecting their parents as role models.175  Breaking the child-parent rela-
tionship causes severe trauma to children and can hinder their de-
velopment.176  And though children can form these attachments with 
more than one caretaker, when forced to separate from their attach-
ment figures, they still suffer emotional harm,177 including lessened 
emotional security, lower self-esteem and a decreased ability to form 
 
172 See e.g., Hayes, 2005 Va. App. LEXIS 431; Martin v. Pittsylvania County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
348 S.E.2d 13 (Va. Ct. App. 1986). 
173 See Jacqueline Barnes & Alan Stein, Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, in 2 NEW OXFORD 
TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 18, at 1848, 1850 (“A longitudinal comparison of 
children reared with or apart from their schizophrenic mother found that the rate of psy-
chopathology was in fact marginally higher in the group reared apart than those who had 
stayed with their mothers.”). 
174 See ROBERTS, supra note 71, at 106 (“[C]hildren’s relationships with a caregiver is essential 
to normal psychological development.”). 
175 See ANNE L. ALSTOTT, NO EXIT:  WHAT PARENTS OWE THEIR CHILDREN AND WHAT SOCIETY 
OWES PARENTS 5 (2004) (“Parents also provide lasting role models which older children 
can begin to identify with—and which teenagers can reject, safe in the knowledge that 
the parent will not leave.”). 
176 See id. (“[H]ealthy emotional development requires a close and enduring relationship 
with one or more parental figures.”). 
177 See ROBERTS, supra note 71, at 106 (“[M]oving children after [bonds of attachment] have 
formed causes serious emotional damage.”). 
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relationships.178  Additional psychological wounds can occur as a re-
sult of separation from siblings and extended family.179  Separation 
from family, particularly due to termination of parental rights, carries 
legal ramifications, such as the loss of a claim to support or inheri-
tance,180 or the loss of the child’s right to voice her position regarding 
parents’ medical treatment.  Participating in medical decisions is a 
highly significant right in the context of parents who are mentally ill 
because, on occasion, the parent may not be competent or capable of 
informed consent regarding her own medical treatment. 
Despite adoption being the ultimate goal of termination and fos-
ter care, a significant number of children are not adopted, are moved 
between multiple placements (“foster care drift”),181 and may reach 
the age of majority while still in foster care, thereby “aging out” of the 
foster system.182  For children of parents with mental illness, never be-
ing adopted is highly likely because of the special needs of most of 
these children.183  It should also be noted that when a child is re-
moved from her home, and certainly when she is subjected to foster 
care drift, her education is affected as well.  For example, changes in 
foster placement may result in changes in schools, compromises in 
educational placements or disturbances to school attendance.  Ad-
justment to new educational settings may hamper academic achieve-
ment and break important social ties.  Finally, children may be placed 
in unsuitable special education settings or not receive special educa-
tion services at all.184 
The most important cause yet for misgivings about foster care’s 
consistency with a child’s best interest is the staggering number of 
 
178 See Wasow, supra note 137, at 219 (maintaining that continual contact with biological par-
ents, even while in foster care, benefits children’s emotional security, self-esteem and re-
lationship skills). 
179 See Radding, supra note 171, at 31 (explaining how “years of bouncing among temporary 
living situations” may destroy emotional bonds with “parents, siblings, grandparents and 
extended family”). 
180 See id. at 31–32 (“[S]evering a child’s ties to his natural parents result in the child’s loss of 
his rights to be supported by them and to inherit from them.”). 
181 See Sarah Ramsey, Fixing Foster Care or Reducing Child Poverty:  The Pew Commission Recom-
mendations and the Transracial Adoption Debate, 66 MONT. L. REV. 21, 24–25 (2005) 
(“[M]any children suffer[] multiple placements over a lengthy period, with some being 
lost in the foster care system.  They [are] caught in . . . foster care ‘drift’ or ‘limbo.’”). 
182 See Wasow, supra note 137, at 219 (stating that many children become legal orphans for a 
significant period of time, many until they reach majority). 
183 See id. (discussing “aging out” in the context of children with special needs). 
184 For the harmful impact of foster care on education, see generally Sarah Hudson-Plush, 
Note, Improving Educational Outcomes for Children in Foster Care:  Reading the McKinney-Vento 
Act’s “Awaiting Foster Care Placement” Provision to Include Children in Interim Foster Care Place-
ments, 13 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 83 (2006). 
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children abused in foster care.  As many as thousands of children are 
subject to abuse or neglect by their foster families.  Others receive in-
adequate medical and psychological treatment while in foster care.185  
Children in foster care are ten times more likely to be abused than 
children not in foster care, and that abuse tends to be more severe.186  
Agencies often fail in their screening, training and supervising of fos-
ter families, who in turn fail to address the likely special developmen-
tal, psychological and medical needs of the children in their care.187  
Perhaps this can explain why removal into foster care in itself is a risk 
factor for a variety of mental health and behavioral problems.188  
Coupled with these children’s vulnerability to such problems because 
of their parent’s mental state, foster care could increase mental 
health harms to children.  A broader take on the child’s best interest 
would lead to a conclusion that a child’s mental health might benefit 
from remaining in her parent’s care.189 
Finally, prolonged proceedings and extended periods of time in 
foster placement may affect the outcome of the termination proceed-
ing.190  Because of changes in children’s attachment,191 needs, and de-
velopmental stages, their “best interests” shift with time, disadvantag-
ing parents from whom they have been separated.192  A presumably 
 
185 See Laura A. Harper, Note, The State’s Duty to Children in Foster Care—Bearing the Burden of 
Protecting Children, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 793, 793 (2003) (“[T]housands [of children in the 
foster care system] suffer abuse or neglect in foster homes and receive inadequate medi-
cal or psychological treatment or other services while in the system.”). 
186 See id. at 796–97 (describing studies conducted by the National Foster Care Education 
Project that found “rates of abuse and neglect of children in foster family care . . . to be 
ten times higher than the rates for children in the general population.”  The study also 
found that foster children are more vulnerable to sexual abuse). 
187 See id. at 797 (“Foster parents often receive inadequate training and lack the support sys-
tem necessary to properly care for foster children, who are likely to experience unique 
developmental, behavioral, and psychological problems due to previous abuse.”). 
188 See Mason et al., supra note 6, at 1106 (“Removal of a child from the home and placement 
in a foster home, in an institution, or with others is in itself an additional risk factor that 
predisposes these children to a multitude of mental and behavioral problems.”). 
189 See Barnes & Stein, supra note 173, at 1850 (“A longitudinal comparison of children 
reared with or apart from their schizophrenic mother found that the rate of psychopa-
thology was in fact marginally higher in the group reared apart than those who had 
stayed with their mothers.”). 
190 See Martin Guggenheim & Christine Gottlieb, Justice Denied:  Delays in Resolving Child Protec-
tion Cases in New York, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 546, 570 (2005) (discussing the effect of 
delays in child welfare cases on the child’s best interest). 
191 See ROBERTS, supra note 71, at 106 (citing arguments that children bond with their “new 
‘psychological parents’” as they are separated from their biological parents for longer pe-
riods). 
192 See Guggenheim & Gottleib, supra note 190, at 570 (arguing that delays result in a choice 
between the child residing with a biological parent or with the primary attachment fig-
ure). 
818 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:3 
 
preferable outcome in which the best interest of the child would con-
verge with her parents’ rights to raise her can be adversely altered by 
the separation,193 perpetuating and reproducing the perceived harms 
that brought on her removal to begin with. 
Determining the child’s best interest is no easy task, and a broad 
perspective, considering different factors such as the detriment 
caused by separation from family and the ills of foster care, should 
color the outcome of a best interest analysis.  It should also be con-
sidered, as I discuss in Part II, that, despite suffering abuse or neglect 
from a parent with a mental illness, the child’s best interest does not 
necessarily diverge from her parent’s fundamental rights to custody.  
Her best interest may in fact be served by conceptualizing family pre-
servation as an aggregated right of both parent and child. 
To sum up this Part, schizophrenia is a severe mental illness that 
can, but does not necessarily at all times, adversely affect parents and 
children.  Under federal and Virginia law, state intervention tends to 
prioritize separation of children from parents in the form of foster 
care or adoption placements.  These laws assume that schizophrenia 
equals parental unfitness and, as such, overly burden parents with 
schizophrenia.  The regulations are further inadequate because of 
problems in assessing mental illness, the assumption that mental ill-
ness is permanent, and a narrow view of the child’s best interest.  
Still, a framework privileging removal of children from the home is 
troubling not only because of the shortcomings described in this Part, 
but also because it infringes on the fundamental right to family integ-
rity and therefore implicates the federal constitutional right to sub-
stantive due process.  I present the argument regarding the unconsti-
tutionality of the family-separation framework in Part II. 
II.  CURRENT INTERVENTIONS—UPHOLDING SUBSTANTIVE DUE 
PROCESS? 
Now that I have discussed and explored the weaknesses of the cur-
rent interventions of federal and Virginia law regarding parents with 
mental illness, it is time to test their constitutionality through the lens 
of substantive due process rights.194  Removal, and subsequent termi-
nation of parental rights, are inconsistent with substantive due proc-
ess rights of both parents and children.  My inquiry progresses in 
three steps, according to the strict scrutiny analysis of substantive due 
 
193 See id. (“The system itself is creating a harm by unnecessarily severing the child’s interest 
in her parental relationship from her interest in her primary attachment.”). 
194 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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process rights articulated in Washington v. Glucksberg.195  As a founda-
tion, I show that family preservation—that is, parents’ rights to cus-
tody of their children, and children’s right to their families’ integ-
rity—is a fundamental right.  Under a concept of aggregated rights, 
parents’ rights do not conflict with children’s rights.  Rather, parents’ 
and children’s positions share a common interest and thereby com-
plement one another. 
Next, I apply strict scrutiny to family separation.  Ordinarily, strict 
scrutiny is framed as the examination of the fitness between the 
state’s compelling interest and its action.  Put differently, courts ex-
amine whether family separation is narrowly tailored to serve the 
state’s compelling interest:  protection of children.  However, the 
remainder of this Article does not treat the strict scrutiny analysis as 
one question.  Rather, I separate its different elements.  Because I 
maintain that, similar to the child’s best interest principle, children’s 
protection requires a broader view, I pay extra attention to the gov-
ernment’s compelling interest in protecting children from abuse and 
neglect.196  The government’s interest must be to protect children 
from harm more generally.  Though the importance of children’s 
protection merits state intervention, this intervention must be nar-
rowly tailored to achieve the state’s interest in order to comply with 
substantive due process.  I therefore proceed to focus my challenge of 
current interventions on two levels:  (a) the interventions are not 
narrowly tailored, or least restrictive; and (b) they fail to achieve the 
state’s compelling interest in protecting children. 
A.  Family Preservation as an Aggregated Fundamental Right 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides 
heightened protection from government intrusion into certain liberty 
interests or fundamental rights.197  Heightened protection requires 
the state to satisfy a higher standard of interest—a compelling state 
interest—in order to justify intervention.  The state must also refrain 
from overstepping its bounds when intervening.  To warrant such 
 
195 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (upholding assisted-suicide ban under strict scrutiny analy-
sis). 
196 Courts tend to skip a rigorous analysis of child protection as a compelling interest.  I do 
not maintain this approach is wrong in that child protection is not a compelling interest.  
My approach differs from that prevalent in the case law in that I perceive a broader view 
of child protection that expands beyond merely preventing their abuse or neglect by par-
ents.  See infra Part II.B. 
197 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719–20 (listing protected rights beyond those specified in the 
Bill of Rights). 
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heightened protection, though, the relevant right subject to state in-
tervention must be a fundamental right.  A fundamental right is one 
that is “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ . . . such 
that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed.’”198  
But are the rights we are concerned with here—parents’ rights and 
children’s rights, both together and severally—fundamental rights? 
1.  Parents’ Fundamental Rights 
Parents have been entrusted by society with the care and respon-
sibility for the well-being of their children under the assumption that 
parents—because of biological ties, societal norms and affection—are 
best equipped, best situated and most driven to act in their child’s 
best interest.199  As a result, the child-parent relationship and the 
process of childrearing have been privileged by the law.  The law al-
lows parents expansive liberties to raise their children as they see fit 
in order to guarantee future citizenship.200  These liberties are so 
deeply rooted in American legal tradition201 that the Supreme Court 
has long recognized the vast freedom parents hold in the childrear-
ing process, framing this freedom as the parents’ right “to direct the 
upbringing and education of children under their control,” free of 
state intervention.202 
A necessary and vital aspect of parents’ liberty in childrearing is a 
parent’s fundamental right to custody of her child.203  As long as par-
ents’ childrearing decisions are reasonable, the state does not inter-
vene in parents’ actions, reflecting a view that procreation, custody, 
and childrearing rights are central to personal autonomy and self-
determination.  Children are perceived to be an extension of one’s 
self, as parenting provides an individual with the opportunity to 
 
198 See id. at 720–21 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); Palko v. 
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26 (1937)). 
199 See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 35 (2005). 
200 See id. at 23–24 (arguing that because state value inculcation is incompatible with limits 
on government intrusion on freedoms of speech and religion, broad parental latitude in 
childrearing decisions is rooted in fundamental tenets of American law). 
201 See Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REV. 637, 643 (2006) 
(“[R]ight to the care and custody of [one’s] child . . . . has deep historical roots and sig-
nificant contemporary adherents in the legal academy; it has driven federal and state leg-
islation and shaped legal doctrine.”). 
202 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (holding Oregon Compulsory Edu-
cation Act, requiring enrollment in public school in the district in which a child resided, 
unconstitutional). 
203 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“It is cardinal with us that the custody, 
care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and 
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”). 
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choose the way of life she prefers and raise her children accord-
ingly.204  Also at the core of parents’ rights to the custody and inculca-
tion of their children is the belief that liberty mandates that children 
be able to become individuals rather than be “standardize[d]” 
through the exclusive instruction of the state and its public educa-
tors.205  It can thus be inferred that, as a matter of democracy and plu-
ralism, parents are to be the primary care-takers of their children, 
and this fundamental right is protected from state intervention, or 
can be only subjected to highly justified and minimal interference.206  
Put differently, the state is severely limited in its ability to separate 
families absent sound reason, such as parental unfitness,207 the inabil-
ity to care for the child,208 or the infliction of harm through abuse or 
neglect.209 
In the context of parents with mental illness, one could argue that 
such parents are (or are at least presumed by Virginia’s prima facie 
rule to be)210 inherently unfit, and therefore parents’ fundamental 
rights do not apply to them.  However, in Santosky v. Kramer,211 the 
Supreme Court ruled that mentally ill parents, like all other parents, 
also have these fundamental rights to custody and childrearing. 
In Santosky, the mentally ill parents challenged the termination of 
their parental rights on procedural due process grounds, claiming 
 
204 See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 199, at 32 (arguing that at the basis of conceptions of self in 
relationships with others is parenting as an expression of “‘self-definition and moral 
choice’” (citing PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES:  THE CONSTITUTION AND 
FAMILY VALUES 168 (1997)). 
205 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535 (“The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in 
this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by 
forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.”). 
206 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66–67 (2000) (overturning statute that allowed 
“‘[a]ny person [to] petition the court for visitation rights at any time’” without considera-
tion of parental opinion of the child’s best interest (citing WASH REV. CODE 
§ 26.10.160(3)).  Though this case examines parents’ procedural due process protections, 
its analysis of parents’ fundamental rights applies to the discussion of such rights here as 
well. 
207 See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (“[I]t is now firmly established that 
‘freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is one of the liberties protected by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.’” (quoting Cleveland Bd. of 
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974))). 
208 See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 199, at 36 (pointing out that government may only interfere 
when parents fail “to exercise a ‘minimum degree of care,’” which is “low”). 
209 See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM ET AL., THE RIGHTS OF FAMILIES 94 (1996) (stating that the pur-
pose of child protection laws it to prevent future harm from abuse or neglect). 
210 VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(B)(2)(a) (2008) (providing that proof of severe mental illness 
is prima facie evidence that conditions of neglect or abuse are not reasonably likely to be 
corrected). 
211 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982) (requiring “clear and convincing evidence” before termina-
tion of parental rights for permanent neglect). 
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that the standard the State of New York used—a “preponderance of 
the evidence”—was unconstitutional.212  Holding that a higher stan-
dard of “clear and convincing evidence” was more appropriate, the 
court addressed parental rights to show that because such rights are 
fundamental, the burden on the state to justify termination of paren-
tal rights should be heavier, even in cases of abuse and neglect.  De-
livering the opinion of the court, Justice Blackmun stated: 
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, 
and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they 
have not been model parents . . . . Even when blood relationships are 
strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable de-
struction of their family life.  If anything, persons faced with forced disso-
lution of their parental rights have a more critical need 
for . . . protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing 
family affairs.  When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, 
it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.213 
This finding that parental rights, particularly when the state wish-
es to end the relationship completely, merit heightened protection, 
led to the Court’s decision that the risk of error from a lower stan-
dard of proof was too great in the context of parental rights and 
should thus be elevated.214  The Court reasoned that the risk of error 
is greater for parents, which merits heightened protection of their 
rights.  The risk for parents is greater than that of the state because 
once parental rights have been terminated in a final decision, the 
termination is irreversible.  The state, on the other hand, may con-
tinuously move for termination upon collecting more or better evi-
dence.215  The Court also stressed that for certain disadvantaged 
groups of parents (poor, undereducated or minorities), termination 
proceedings carry heightened risks because of cultural or class bias, 
which a court must help counter.216  This is also true for parents with 
mental illness who face stigmatization that may adversely influence 
proceedings concerning parental rights.217  Therefore, parents with 
 
212 Id. at 747. 
213 Id. at 753–54. 
214 See id. at 758 (“In parental rights termination proceedings, the private interest affected is 
commanding . . . .”). 
215 Id. at 764 (“If the State initially fails to win termination . . . it always can try once again to 
cut off the parents’ rights after gathering more or better evidence.”). 
216 Id. at 762–63 (“Because parents subject to termination proceedings are often poor, un-
educated, or members of minority groups, such proceedings are often vulnerable to 
judgments based on cultural or class bias.” (internal citations omitted)). 
217 See Wasow, supra note 137, at 221 (“A central and enduring aspect of stigmatization of 
people with mental disabilities is the belief that they are violent.  This belief prompts a 
particularly negative response to parents with mental illnesses . . . . Such biases even affect 
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mental illness are in great need of more balanced and protective ad-
judication that will enable the preservation of their families and rela-
tionships with their children. 
2.  Children’s Interest in Family Preservation 
Undoubtedly, children have a right to be protected and free from 
neglect or abuse at the hand of their parents,218 and are guaranteed a 
minimal degree of care.219  It is reasonable, then, to view abusive or 
neglectful homes as violative of children’s rights, and family preserva-
tion as conflicting with such rights.220  Yet, the protection of a child 
from abuse and neglect by removal from her home may ultimately 
come at a very high price to her—so much, in fact, that removal is as 
much a violation of her rights as it is of her parents’.221  As I have sug-
gested previously in this Article,222 perhaps here, too, a broad concept 
of children’s rights that goes beyond abuse and neglect by their par-
ents is appropriate.  Other considerations, such as the bond between 
parent and child or the potential conditions and possible harms of 
foster care, should also inform decisions about the child’s best inter-
est. 
Law and sociology professor Dorothy Roberts has maintained that 
the highly intrusive aspects of ASFA that enable more removals of 
children and terminations of parental rights might actually be incon-
sistent with children’s rights on a macro-level because children are 
now more vulnerable to the ills of foster care:  abuse, neglect, foster 
drift and others.223  Because such problems in the foster care system 
are inconsistent with children’s rights, family preservation may not 
 
mental health professionals, and may influence their judgments about parental fit-
ness . . . .”). 
218 See GUGGENHEIM ET AL., supra note 209, at 94 (declaring that child protection laws aim to 
protect against abuse and neglect). 
219 See Joel Fienberg, The Child’s Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD?  CHILDREN’S 
RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 124, 125 (William Aiken & Hugh LaFol-
lette eds., 1980) (describing rights common to all children that derive from their de-
pendence on others for basic care). 
220 For more on the debate concerning the possible divergence of children’s rights and fam-
ily preservation, see generally Dorothy E. Roberts, Is There Justice in Children’s Rights?  The 
Critique of Federal Family Preservation Policy, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 112, 115–17 (1999). 
221 See Huntington, supra note 201, at 639 (citing scholars’ and advocates’ arguments that 
removal from biological parents violates children’s rights). 
222 See supra Part I.C.4.c, where I argue for a broad concept of the child’s best interest. 
223 See Roberts, supra note 220, at 125–28 (advocating that focus should be put on lessening 
the need for removal of children from biological parents because emphasis on perma-
nent adoption does not reduce foster care populations). 
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only be in the child’s best interest but it may be an aspect of her own 
fundamental right to remain with her parents.224 
Federal courts have also recognized family preservation as a 
child’s right.  In the due process and equal protection claims of Jor-
dan v. Jackson,225 the parents challenged Virginia’s removal of their 
son when he was not in imminent harm of irreversible danger.  In 
addition to reiterating that family preservation was a fundamental 
right of the parents, the court found that the child, too, had a consti-
tutional right to the integrity of his family, infringed upon by the ex-
tended separation from his parents due to removal into foster care.226 
Those most concerned with protection of children may continue 
to maintain that the child’s right to family preservation still is not tan-
tamount to her fundamental right to be safe and free from abuse.  
Yet, aggregating parents’ rights and children’s rights (conceiving of 
both as different aspects of the same right—that of family preserva-
tion) elevates children’s rights to the level of a fundamental right that 
merits strict scrutiny of any state action attempting to intervene in it.  
In other words, I do not argue that child protection is insignificant, 
but that a balance that privileges child protection over family preser-
vation should be shifted to afford family protection more weight and 
greater consideration to a nuanced perspective about both rights of 
the child in particular cases. 
3.  Aggregating Rights to Family Preservation 
Traditionally, in the context of abuse and neglect, parents’ rights 
and children’s rights were considered in opposition to each other.227  
This need not be the case when both rights are framed in terms of 
family preservation, which, as I have demonstrated in my discussion 
of children’s rights and the child’s best interest, do not always conflict 
with children’s protection. 
Proposing a framework of couples’ aggregated rights, law profes-
sor Holning Lau explains that aggregated rights acknowledge both 
the individual’s right to belong to certain social groups in which 
 
224 See Huntington, supra note 201, at 651 (“[F]amily preservation reflects both parents’ 
rights (not to have a child removed unnecessarily) and children’s rights (not to be re-
moved unnecessarily).”). 
225 15 F.3d 333, 336–37 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that emergency child removal statute delay-
ing judicial review for up to sixty-five hours did not violate parents’ due process or child’s 
equal protection rights). 
226 Id. at 351. 
227 See Huntington, supra note 201, at 639–40 (arguing that a rights-based model perpetuates 
adversarial decision-making in the child welfare system). 
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membership is inherent to her identity, and the group’s own right to 
thrive.228  If one’s identity, self-determination and autonomy are rela-
tional to the social groups with which she associates and that are fun-
damental to her self-development, then those social groups must exist 
and continue to develop in order to protect the rights of the indi-
viduals in the group.229  Lau maintains, therefore, that the group—or 
couple—itself holds rights that are worthy of protection.230 
Drawing on Lau’s aggregated rights framework, it follows that if 
cultural, racial or sexual groups merit protection as rights-holding 
collectives because of their contribution to identity and sense of self, 
this is certainly true of families as the most immediate and significant 
social network, and therefore most influential on one’s sense of self.  
Family preservation, then, is the right of the family as a whole, not 
just the parents’ right to the custody and rearing of their children or 
the children’s right not to be separated from their parents. 
A theory of family rights as a joint right of family members has al-
so been proposed by Jane Rutherford.231  Rutherford argues that in 
order to bridge family unity with protection of individual family 
members, the law must adopt a framework that privileges family 
rights as fundamental rights that belong to the family as a group.232  
She reasons that focusing on individuals’ rights within families ob-
scures the need to protect the family as a unit from state interven-
tion.233  The only exception Rutherford supports is the protection of a 
weaker party when competing rights exist.234  Since, in the case of 
parents with schizophrenia, though, it is not always clear who the 
weaker party is—parent or child—this exception may not apply 
here.235 
 
228 See Holning Lau, Transcending the Individualist Paradigm in Sexual Orientation Antidiscrimi-
nation Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1271, 1273 (2006) (“The basic premise of group rights—and 
of the couples’ rights I propose—is that an individual’s identity is inextricably linked to 
her memberships in certain social collectives.  Accordingly, protecting that individual re-
quires not only protecting her individual right to associate with those collective entities, 
but also protecting those entities’ aggregate rights to develop.”) 
229 See id. at 1281–82 (discussing transcending individualism and the individual’s right to self-
development). 
230 See id. at 1282 (“[T]o protect the individual’s right to self-development, it is imperative to 
protect the . . . group on which the individual relies to develop her sense of self.” (cita-
tion omitted)). 
231 See Jane Rutherford, Beyond Individual Privacy:  A New Theory of Family Rights, 39 U. FLA. L. 
REV. 627, 643 (1987). 
232 Id. 
233 Id. at 644. 
234 Id. at 643. 
235 Consider, in addition to the imparities caused to parents by mental illness and children’s 
general position as less powerful, the possibility presented above of role reversals between 
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Aggregated rights theory already informs the custody placements 
of minority children.  For example, Native American children are to 
be placed with extended family, within their tribe or within the Na-
tive American community as much as possible.236  This placement pre-
ference demonstrates a recognition that protection of children can 
and should be achieved while preserving Native American families or 
tribes as a right-holding group.237  Put differently, the group rights of 
the tribe to protect its existence and continuity are not at opposition 
to the child’s right to safety and are seen as a joint interest in preserv-
ing the tribe. 
In Santosky v. Kramer, Justice Blackmun seems to support aggre-
gated rights to family preservation over adversarial views of parents’ 
rights versus children’s rights.238  Justice Blackmun notes that the as-
sumption that termination inherently benefits the child is perhaps 
incorrect and that parents and children have common interests.239 
Conceptualizing family preservation as an aggregated right of 
both parents and children is a wider view that manifests the conver-
gence of parents’ rights and the child’s rights and best interest.  Mov-
ing away from a framework of adversarial rights, toward that of ag-
gregated rights, allows for an examination of children’s rights and 
best interest informed by the parent-child relationship and the fam-
ily’s dynamic as a cohesive group.240  As an aggregated right, family 
preservation is bolstered as fundamental, not just for parents, but for 
children as well.241  The argument in favor of family preservation that 
is beneficial to all parties involved grows stronger, and state interven-
tion need be more subtle.  Expanding our perception of the costs 
and benefits to the family as a whole can facilitate a more refined 
standard of state intervention and a more nuanced solution that en-
 
parents and children as caregivers to each other.  See Walton-Moss et al., supra note 57, at 
629. 
236 See James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children’s Existing Rights in State Decision Making About 
Their Relationships, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 845, 899–900 (2003) (explaining the rights 
granted by the Indian Child Welfare Act). 
237 Id. 
238 455 U.S. 745, 766–67 (1982). 
239 Id. at 765. 
240 See Radding, supra note 171, at 36 (“Still others argue that the child’s best interest cannot 
be evaluated independently from consideration of the primary adults.”). 
241 Though I believe a framework of aggregated rights is most appropriate, since parents and 
children have an individually recognized fundamental right to family integrity, the sub-
stantive due process argument I make in this Article does not rise or fall by accepting that 
parents and children hold aggregated rights.  The aggregated rights framework makes 
the case for family integrity stronger, but is not the only framework upon which family in-
tegrity is based. 
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sures child protection but does not impose too grave a harm to family 
unity. 
B.  Child Protection as a Compelling State Interest 
After establishing that family preservation is a fundamental right, 
courts apply strict scrutiny to determine whether the state action vio-
lates the right holder’s substantive due process right.  To withstand 
such scrutiny, the state must show a compelling interest that is served 
by the state action in question.  Here, the state interest is the protec-
tion of children from abuse or neglect. 
Despite the status of parental rights and family preservation as 
fundamental rights, they are not absolute, and the family unit is not 
beyond the intervention of the state.242  The family and thus the child 
are subject to the state’s interest in the child’s life, safety and well-
being.  As parens patriae, the state bears the responsibility of being the 
ultimate protector of abused or neglected children.243  Underlying the 
state’s interest is that the child “be both safeguarded from abuses and 
given opportunities for growth into free and independent well-
developed men and citizens.”244  Put differently, because of children’s 
status as potential citizens who should contribute to society, the state 
is entitled to protect children from harm to their physical or mental 
health and development.245 
State intervention, however, should not be impetuous.  In a case 
discussing parental authority to deny a child medical treatment, a 
California appellate court articulated the standards and considera-
tions required for the state to limit parents’ rights.246  To justify inter-
vention, the court held, the state needed to meet a “serious burden” 
of serving the child’s best interest.  The state can satisfy this height-
ened burden by demonstrating the gravity of harm to the child or the 
substantial likelihood of serious harm, the evaluation and risks from 
 
242 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“[T]he family itself is not beyond 
regulation in the public interest, as against a claim of religious liberty.”). 
243 See Radding, supra note 171, at 33–34 (discussing the parens patria doctrine, “in which the 
State as ultimate protector may safeguard children by invading the familial sanctum to 
separate abusive and neglectful parents from their children”). 
244 Prince, 321 U.S. at 165. 
245 See In re Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51 (Ct. App. 1979) (“Parental autonomy, however, is 
not absolute.  The state is the guardian of society’s basic values.  Under the doctrine of 
parens patriae, the state has a right, indeed, a duty, to protect children.”). 
246 Id.  The California Court of Appeals considered a case of parents refusing heart treat-
ment to their son as a neglect case.  The state argued the parents did not provide their 
son with the “necessities of life.” 
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treatment, and the child’s own preference.247  Applying these factors 
to the context of removal or termination of parental rights, the state’s 
compelling interest in protecting children from abuse or neglect 
would require the state to weigh more than just the potential harm to 
the child if she was left with her parents.  Additional considerations, 
as an analogy to medical treatment, must be the conditions of foster 
care, the feasibility of reunification and the possibility and likelihood 
of adoption.  The state might consider the conditions of the child’s 
potential placement (for instance, with a family versus in a group 
home), the ramifications to the child’s education (i.e., the interrup-
tion to the child’s school attendance or educational placement), or 
the child’s age, emotional and cognitive skills (as indicative of her 
ability to adjust to foster care or her chances of adoption). 
It should be noted, though, that the state’s interest is not limited 
to the protection of children from abuse.  Rather, the state has other 
compelling interests in strengthening families through family preser-
vation248 and in distributing resources efficiently and conservatively so 
that only useful interventions are funded.249  Since the state must bal-
ance both its internally conflicting interests as well as the conflict be-
tween its interest and the rights of the family, it is not only limited in 
its opportunities for intervention, but also in the form and scope of 
intervention.  Once the state has presented its compelling interest in 
protecting a child, it establishes its authority to intervene in the fam-
ily.  Yet, the state would still need to address the means it utilizes for 
such intervention, namely separation of the family through removal 
or termination, and demonstrate that such means of intervention are 
consistent with substantive due process rights by being narrowly tai-
lored to serve the state’s interest.  The remainder of this Article ques-
tions whether state interventions that implicate family integrity are in 
fact consistent with substantive due process for two reasons.  First, 
these interventions do not serve the state interest; they fail to protect 
the child’s best interest.  Second, family separation is not the least re-




248 See Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 346 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he state also shares the inter-
est of the parent and child in their family’s integrity because the welfare of the state de-
pends in large part upon the strength of the family.” (citation omitted)). 
249 See generally ROBERTS, supra note 71, at 134–35 (“The availability of federal matching 
funds for foster care may provide a financial incentive to remove these children from 
their homes.”). 
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C.  Removal and Substantive Due Process—Serving the Compelling State 
Interest? 
When the state infringes on the fundamental right of family integ-
rity, in addition to showing a compelling interest, the state must 
demonstrate that that interest is advanced by the means the state util-
izes and that these means are the least restrictive ones to serve that 
interest.250  Put differently, to survive the strict scrutiny test of substan-
tive due process and pass constitutional muster, removal of children 
or termination of parental rights must achieve protection of children 
from neglect or abuse.251  However, removal or termination do not 
necessarily protect children, and may perhaps even harm them.  Re-
moval or termination therefore excessively limit the right to family 
integrity and could violate substantive due process.  My argument, 
though, should not be taken to be overly sweeping.  I do not mean to 
state that in all cases termination or removal are inconsistent with 
substantive due process rights.  I merely maintain that, under current 
law,252 which already over-burdens parents with schizophrenia, courts 
should be aware of the heightened risk of wrongful separations, 
should exercise greater caution and should apply more in-depth scru-
tiny to such cases. 
It is imperative that courts deeply analyze cases, because without 
such examination it is questionable whether separation in fact 
achieves child protection in a particular case.  First, as discussed 
above,253 the presumption that the existence of mental incapacity in a 
 
250 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment 
‘forbids the government to infringe . . . ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter 
what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compel-
ling state interest.’” (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993))); Moore v. East 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977).  In Moore, Justice Powell explained the appropriate-
ness of strict scrutiny in cases concerning family preservation.  “[W]hen the government 
intrudes on choices concerning family living arrangements, this Court must examine 
carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which 
they are served by the challenged regulation.”  Id. 
251 The other prong to strict scrutiny analysis for substantive due process—that the means 
utilized by the state are narrowly tailored, or the least restrictive alternative—will be dis-
cussed extensively in Part III, in which I propose PACTs as a possible, less restrictive al-
ternative to removal or termination of parental rights. 
252 As I discussed above in Part I.C.1, although ASFA does not explicitly address parents with 
schizophrenia, its directives—particularly the financial incentives it prescribes—are the 
overarching framework that creates and further reproduces states’ prioritization of re-
moval or termination.  Though this Part primarily analyzes the Virginia statutory frame-
work, the arguments raised here regarding removal’s or termination’s failure to achieve 
the state’s interest in protecting children similarly apply to removal or termination as 
proscribed by ASFA. 
253 See supra Parts I.C.4.a–b. 
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parent leads to unfit parenting is misguided.  Keeping in mind the 
concerns surrounding assessment,254 it may be the case that a parent’s 
mental problems do not rise to the level of incapacity.255  Further, if 
there is a mental incapacity, without proper assessment, it is uncer-
tain whether such incapacity does actually lead to unfitness.  Recall 
that persons with schizophrenia have not been found to be more vio-
lent than people not suffering from schizophrenia,256 thus assump-
tions as to inevitability of ties between schizophrenia and abuse can-
not stand.  Also, recovery rates seem higher than an individual 
prognosis may predict.257  Therefore, permanency of unfitness is very 
uncertain, which is further reason to doubt the link between schizo-
phrenia and unfitness and the adequacy of termination, particularly.  
A court that does not look into or question the parent’s assessment is 
unable to adequately conclude that a parent is unfit or abusive. 
Second, separation of children from their parents may not achieve 
child protection, because when courts assume that a finding (even a 
wrongful one) of unfitness is sufficient for removal or termination, 
these courts do not look into whether or not a child is actually 
harmed.258  This assumption alone, without a showing of harm to the 
child, disconnects the state’s action (i.e., removal or termination) 
from the state’s interest.  The  Jenkins case is a good example of this.259  
Recall that in that case, the court stated that there is no need for a 
showing of actual harm, just of a “substantial risk” of harm.260  This 
may seem like an adequate ruling that is consistent with the state’s 
compelling interest to ensure protecting children.  After all, erring 
on the safe side by removing a child facing that risk could seem rea-
sonable.  However, we must remember that family integrity is a fun-
damental right warranting strict scrutiny.  Therefore, a “risk of harm” 
should not be sufficient.  If a child is not harmed, there is no real 
need for protecting that child (especially when parenting skills im-
prove, as was the case in Jenkins).261  Separation achieves no state in-
 
254 See supra Part I.C.3.a. 
255 See Ackerson, supra note 4, at 190 (“Because mental illness can include a broad array of 
conditions, it is erroneous to assume that all mothers or fathers who have a diagnosed 
mental disorder are alike.”). 
256 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
257 See Wasow, supra note 137, at 212–13 (“[A] poor correlation exists between prognosis and 
actual outcome of treatment.”). 
258 See supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text. 
259 Jenkins v. Winchester Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 409 S.E.2d 16 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (holding 
that the statutory definition of an abused or neglected child does not require proof of ac-
tual harm or impairment having been experienced by the child). 
260 Id. at 1183. 
261 Id. at 1184. 
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terest, as that interest is irrelevant when a child is not subject to ne-
glect or abuse.  When a fundamental right is at issue there cannot be 
a considerable disconnect between the means and the state interest. 
Another reason why courts should be more critical as to whether 
removal or termination do in fact achieve the state’s interest in pro-
tecting children is the broader perspective of the child’s best inter-
est.262  According to this broader view, courts should examine whether 
removal or termination could actually harm the child in question.  
The harms that courts should take into account are the child’s own 
mental health, which could deteriorate upon separation from a par-
ent,263 the legal ramifications such as loss of property or other 
rights,264 and, of course, the harms of foster care:  foster care drift,265 
aging out,266 abuse and neglect,267 and disturbances to education.268  
Perhaps courts would do better, then, to balance the harms posed to 
children who remain in the home against the harms that may occur 
upon removal or termination.  Courts are unable to take on this bal-
ancing task, though, if they do not engage in rigorous analysis into 
these risks of harm.  Courts that do not examine the child’s vulner-
ability to harm both at home and as a result of separation, and that 
do not make conclusive findings that harms to children who are not 
removed from the home are greater, should not assume that removal 
of a child ensures her protection. 
Finally, because family separation is the primary measure the state 
utilizes to protect children from harm by parents with schizophrenia, 
the risk to children is exacerbated.  Parents are deterred from access-
ing services that can help them recover because of their fear that the 
 
262 See Part I.C.3.c. 
263 See Barnes & Stein, supra note 173, at 1850 (“A longitudinal comparison of children 
reared with or apart from their schizophrenic mother found that the rate of psychopa-
thology was in fact marginally higher in the group reared apart than those who had 
stayed with their mothers.”); see also ALSTOTT, supra note 175, at 5 (“[P]sychologists em-
phasize the importance of recreating continuity for . . . children . . . .”). 
264 See Radding, supra note 171, at 31–32 (“[S]evering a child’s ties to his natural parents re-
sult in the child’s loss of his rights to be supported by them and to inherit from them.”). 
265 See Ramsey, supra note 181, at 24–25 (“[M]any children suffer[] multiple placements over 
a lengthy period, with some being lost in the foster care system.  They [are] caught 
in . . . foster care ‘drift’ or ‘limbo.’”). 
266 See Wasow, supra note 137, at 219 (stating that many children become legal orphans for a 
significant period of time, many until they reach majority). 
267 See Harper, supra note 185, at 793 (“[T]housands [of children in the foster care system] 
suffer abuse or neglect in foster homes and receive inadequate medical or psychological 
treatment or other services while in the system.”). 
268 See Hudson-Plush, supra note 184, at 84 (“[T]he foster care system is replete with exam-
ples of foster children suffering poor educational outcomes.”). 
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state will initiate removal of children.269  Therefore, the parent’s 
strong interest in receiving treatment and achieving recovery is un-
dermined, resulting in a probable deterioration in their mental con-
dition.  Consequently, the child’s safety, too, is compromised because 
of the parent’s deteriorating condition.  By the time the state inter-
venes, if at all, the parent may be suffering terribly, the child could 
have been severely harmed or the situation could be otherwise too 
dire to avoid extreme measures such as hospitalization and family se-
paration. 
Removal or termination of parental rights must ensure child pro-
tection if they are to satisfy the substantive due process test by surviv-
ing strict scrutiny (provided they are the least restrictive means avail-
able, which the next Part discusses).  However, family separation does 
not necessarily achieve child protection, and might actually harm a 
child.  I suggest, therefore, that in order for removal or termination 
to be consistent with substantive due process, to not violate the fun-
damental right to family integrity, and to still protect children, they 
must be exercised by the state upon both a showing that a child is 
harmed at home and that such harm is greater than the harm caused 
by removal or termination and foster care placement.  Otherwise, the 
risk of wrongful removal and infringement of a fundamental right is 
far too great.270 
III.  A NEW CONCEPT OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS:  ACHIEVING 
FAMILY PRESERVATION 
Satisfying the last prong of the substantive due process test is high-
ly contingent on the availability of less restrictive means that are an 
alternative to more severe state intervention.  Moreover, the alterna-
tive, less restrictive means must also be related to the state’s compel-
ling interest; that is, the means must achieve child protection.  Simi-
lar to education law, where removal of children from home and into 
residential education settings in order to provide special education 
services is considered overly restrictive if special education can be 
provided at school or at home through individual education pro-
 
269 See Benjet et al., supra note 43, at 238 (arguing that diagnosis of a major mental illness 
alone often suffices for termination of parental rights, without consideration of actual pa-
renting ability). 
270 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 764 (1982) (finding that the risk of error is greater 
for parents than the state:  once separation has occurred and termination may follow, 
there is a great risk that separation will become irreversible for the parents, while the 
state could continuously move for removal or termination). 
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grams,271 it so follows that removal or termination is overly restrictive 
when children can be protected from neglect or abuse while remain-
ing in their parents’ custody.  As the alternative to removal of chil-
dren, I propose here the use of Programs for Assertive Community 
Treatments (PACT or PACTs), which social scientists have long rec-
ognized as efficient and effective in treating schizophrenia.  Notably, 
PACTs are not completely foreign to the law.  Indeed, at least one ju-
risdiction uses PACTs as an alternative to criminal proceedings, and 
others have considered their use.  Reshaped to accommodate fami-
lies, PACTs present multiple advantages for families dealing with a 
parent’s mental illness and the abuse or neglect of children.  Family-
oriented PACTs both treat parents and strengthen their parental 
skills while children remain in their custody.  PACTs can also satisfy 
the state’s obligation to provide services to struggling families and 
can help lower costs, financial or otherwise, of social and welfare ser-
vices.272  More importantly still, PACTs have the ability to prevent re-
moval of children from the home by directly addressing the problems 
families face and empowering these families to overcome such prob-
lems.  I end this Part addressing some of the reservations that may 
arise in incorporating PACTs as an alternative to removal of children 
or termination of parental rights. 
A.  Programs of Assertive Community Treatment (PACTs) for Schizophrenia 
Before evaluating PACTs as preventative alternatives for removal 
or termination, it is essential to understand what these programs are, 
how they are structured and operate, and their efficacy. 
PACTs originated in the 1970s as an integrated clinical treat-
ment273 that would substitute hospitalization of persons with schizo-
phrenia,274 and have since been continuously empirically validated.275  
 
271 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2006) (stating that children with disabilities are not to be re-
moved from regular classroom instruction unless their disabilities are so severe that edu-
cation may not otherwise be achieved). 
272 See Gold et al., supra note 9, at 295 (addressing concerns that PACTs financially drain 
states:  “The research evidence [shows] . . . the provision of PACT . . . reduces the burden 
placed on health and human service systems”); Mason et al., supra note 6, at 1118 (“In the 
long run [PACTs are] . . . more cost effective by reducing the negative effect on parents, 
their children and other family members, as well as on the overall community and soci-
ety . . . .”). 
273 See Gold et al., supra note 9, at 290 (describing a PACT as a “multidisciplinary team ap-
proach, [that] delivers integrated community-based treatment, rehabilitation, and sup-
port services”). 
274 See Anthony F. Lehman et al., Evidence-Based Treatment for Schizophrenia, 26 PSYCHIATRIC 
CLINICS N. AM. 939, 943 (2003) (describing PACTs’ purpose of treating “high risk” indi-
viduals who need more than typical community-based treatment). 
834 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:3 
 
PACTs are built as teams of professionals from multiple disciplines 
who provide constant, comprehensive interdisciplinary services and 
support,276 including at times of emergency.277  The goal is recovery;278 
to achieve and sustain clients’ participation and functioning in the 
community.279  Usually, PACT teams are comprised of at least a coor-
dinator, social worker, nurse, psychologist, employment specialist, 
substance abuse specialist and a psychiatrist.280  PACTs that are geared 
toward a specific skill set or area of life function typically include an 
appropriate professional.  For example, a team working on a person’s 
family issues may include a couples’ therapist or parenting specialist.  
An empathetic, cooperative and continuous relationship between the 
team and the client is crucial for the program’s success in achieving 
recovery.281  Paul B. Gold et al. describe the relationship between cli-
ent and PACT team as follows: 
Both clients and PACT teams, in their joint efforts, are the primary 
change agents. . . . [A] PACT team[] . . . engage[s] clients into working 
alliances, making it clear that the team recognizes suffering and wishes to 
alleviate it.  The . . . working alliance depends on the team’s gentle ef-
forts . . . to instill hope for relief, foster a sense of safety and personal 
control, motivate taking on the tasks of healing, respecting and ensuring 
self-determination on the pathway to healing, and restoration of self-
identity as a “whole” person.282 
As the relationship progresses, and as a way to empower clients 
and develop problem-solving skills, the team includes the patient in 
designing her own recovery plan and determining the goals of treat-
ment and appropriate interventions, given the patient’s symptoms 
 
275 See Gold et al., supra note 9, at 291 (reporting that the Schizophrenia Patient Outcomes 
Research Team lists PACT as a “recommended . . . first-line service”). 
276 See Lehman et al., supra note 274, at 943 (describing “coverage 24 hours a day, 7 days a 
week”). 
277 See Gold et al., supra note 9, at 293 (discussing availability of on-call staff and psychiatrists 
during nonbusiness hours). 
278 See id. at 294 (defining recovery as “full community participation . . . [which] include[s] 
(a) symptom stability, (b) health maintenance and care of medical conditions, (c) low to 
no use of emergency and inpatient psychiatric facilities, public safety resources, or the ju-
dicial system, (d) stability in independent living arrangements, and (e) normalization of 
activities of daily living” (emphasis added)). 
279 See Catherine F. Kane & Michael B. Blank, NPACT:  Enhancing Programs of Assertive Com-
munity Treatment for the Seriously Mentally Ill, 40 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 549, 550 
(2004) (detailing recovery aimed at reduction of symptoms and substance abuse; stable 
housing; employment; and better maintenance of physical health and criminal justice sys-
tem interactions). 
280 See id. 
281 See Gold et al., supra note 9, at 291 (“PACT minimizes fragmentation of services and pro-
motes continuity of provider-client relationships . . . .”). 
282 See id. 
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and environmental circumstances.283  The plan is modified to ac-
commodate the client’s changing needs and preferences to maintain 
improvement.284 
Because of their ability to mitigate the severity and shorten the 
period of symptoms,285 PACTs have been shown to significantly de-
crease the need for hospitalization, both during initial acute phases 
of schizophrenia and during relapse.286  Research on PACTs has also 
produced evidence of patient satisfaction, which is particularly im-
portant as people with schizophrenia struggle with commencing and 
continuing treatment.287  Other evidence shows that PACTs improve 
the clinical condition of schizophrenia, advance functioning (particu-
larly when they are designed to address a particular area of life or 
skill set, such as vocational training) and heighten quality of life.288  
Programs that have the best results are those most loyal to the origi-
nal key elements of the programs,289 though programs that are de-
signed to improve specific domains facilitate marked improvement in 
those areas.290 
For families struggling with a parent’s schizophrenia, PACTs are 
vitally important and immensely beneficial for several reasons.  First, 
as PACTs are comprehensive services led by a multi-disciplinary team, 
PACTs can successfully address the multitude of issues with which 
families (both as individuals and as a whole) may be dealing.  Also, 
when one team works with the family, that entire team coordinates its 
efforts to advance every member of the family.  This is more benefi-
cial than several teams providing services that may overlap or be in-
consistent with one another.  An additional concern is that services by 
different teams lead to incompatibility of services for one family 
member with the needs of another’s. 
 
283 See id. at 292 (describing treatment plans as “highly detailed and individualized”). 
284 See id. (explaining that depending on degree and duration of disability, services may con-
tinue for many years). 
285 See Kane & Blank, supra note 279, at 550 (documenting fewer hospital and emergency 
room visits, and of shorter duration). 
286 See Lehman et al., supra note 274, at 943 (discussing randomized trials showing reduction 
of inpatient and more continuous outpatient treatment). 
287 See Michael G. Gelder et al., Clinical Syndromes of Adult Psychiatry, in 2 NEW OXFORD 
TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 18, at 574 (listing lack of insight, which occurs in 
90% of people with schizophrenia, as a factor in refusal of treatment). 
288 See Lehman et al., supra note 274, at 943 (pointing out that research on other outcomes 
has been less conistent). 
289 See Gold et al., supra note 9, at 294 (describing study showing that programs highly consis-
tent with PACT standards had the biggest reductions in hospital days). 
290 See id. at 294–95.  Examples include employment, substance abuse and family function-
ing. 
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Second, by fostering a working alliance and encouraging the ser-
vice recipient to take an active role in designing the treatment plan, 
PACTs are able to empower everyone in the family and rectify power 
imbalances.  This is particularly important for children, as proactive 
participation in the family treatment might mitigate emotional harms 
inflicted by the parent’s illness or abuse and restore the child’s sense 
of agency.291  By mitigating emotional harms PACTs can also lower 
the risk that the child herself develops a severe mental health prob-
lem later in life. 
Third, PACTs’ proven ability to alleviate symptoms of schizophre-
nia, and to do so in a short period of time,292 means that these services 
can help shorten the length of time a child may be in danger of ne-
glect or abuse, if not eliminate that danger altogether.  PACTs’ 
strength in preventing hospitalization293 also reduces the need to find 
alternative care for children while a parent is absent due to hospitali-
zation. 
Lastly, providing services in the form of PACTs, where recipients’ 
satisfaction is high,294 incentivizes parents to turn to treatment and 
commit to it.  Because parents are reluctant to seek treatment for fear 
of losing their children,295 an effective family treatment alternative 
that can help ensure family preservation and prevent removal is vital.  
Without it, a parent’s condition might deteriorate, resulting in a 
heightened risk of neglect or abuse and subsequent removal or ter-
mination. 
B.  PACTs in the Law:  Alternative to Criminal Proceedings 
Noting the recognition PACTs have achieved in the social sci-
ences, lawmakers have begun to incorporate PACTs into the legal sys-
 
291 For the psychological harm caused by imbalanced relationships, as well as the need for re-
shifting that imbalance and empowering the weaker party, see generally Orly Rachmilo-
vitz, Bringing Down the Bedroom Walls:  Emphasizing Substance over Form in Personalized Abuse, 
14 WM & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 495 (2008). 
292 See Kane & Blank, supra note 279, at 550 (stating that services are aimed at reducing “du-
ration [and] intensity” of symptoms). 
293 See Lehman et al., supra note 274, at 943 (citing a study showing substantial reduction in 
inpatient care). 
294 See Gelder et al., supra note 287, at 574 (explaining that patients’ lack of insight to their 
psychosis, as well as inadequate education and fear of side effects, impede the formation 
of therapeutic relationships, contributing to refusal of treatment). 
295 See Busch & Redlich, supra note 50, at 1000–02, and accompanying text, discussing the 
finding that for at least some parents, the fear of losing child custody results in the delay 
of necessary treatment. 
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tem.296  Orange and Osceola Counties in Florida have gone so far as 
to establish PACTs as an alternative to criminal proceedings under 
the special needs diversion program.297  The Texas legislature has also 
recommended incorporating PACTs to serve criminal courts in an at-
tempt to prevent incarceration of persons with severe mental ill-
ness.298  As the Florida program is already in place, it is the focus of 
this Part. 
The Florida special needs diversion program aims to redirect 
people with mental health or other special needs out of the criminal 
justice system, and instead provide them with the most appropriate 
treatment to their needs while still ensuring community protection.299  
Identification of those in need of services, as part of the diversion 
program, is made by corrections health services staff upon arrest, or 
by referrals from justice officials, family members or others in the 
community who believe a mental disorder is at the root of one’s in-
volvement in the criminal system.300  Individuals excluded from the 
program are those currently charged or formerly convicted of gener-
ally violent crimes or sex crimes, including crimes against children.301  
 
296 Examples include:  Oklahoma’s statutory definition of PACT (among other state recog-
nized mental health services), OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 3-302(8) (2008); Massachusetts’ bill 
to allocate state funds to PACTs, H.B. 5300, 182d Gen. Ct., 2002 Mass. Acts 412; and New 
Jersey’s proclaimed encouragement of state established PACTs, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:9A-1 
(West 2009). 
297 Amended Order Governing Pretrial Release, Pretrial Detention, and First Appearance 
Proceedings in Orange County at 69, Admin. Order No. 2003-39-12 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 7, 
2003), available at http://www.ninthcircuit.org/research/legal_research.shtml (listing 
Florida Assertive Community Treatment as part of the treatment component of a volun-
tary Mental Health Court program).  Florida also has specialized Mental Health Courts 
that deal with mentally disabled offenders in an attempt to direct them into treatment ra-
ther than incarceration.  See generally LeRoy L. Kondo, Advocacy of the Establishment of Men-
tal Health Specialty Courts in the Provision of Therapeutic Justice for Mentally Ill Offenders, 29 AM. 
J. CRIM. L. 255 (2001) (arguing that mental health courts provide a partial solution to le-
gal and social problems created by criminal cases involving defendants with mental disor-
ders); Susan Stefan & Bruce J. Winick, A Dialogue on Mental Health Courts, 11 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 507 (2005) (debating the efficacy of the mental health court model from 
the perspectives of an academic specializing in therapeutic jurisprudence and an advo-
cate for the rights of the mentally disabled). 
298 See AUSTIN TRAVIS COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH AND MENTAL RETARDATION CENTER, JAIL 
DIVERSION INITIATIVE (2005).  This report recommends that PACTs that are already in 
use in Texas be expanded, and that special teams be dedicated to servicing courts.  How-
ever, for this to be effective, the state should allocate additional funding, and courts must 
be aware of the high success rates of PACTs both in providing treatment and in decreas-
ing recidivism. 
299 See Amended Order Governing Pretrial Release, Pretrial Detention, and First Appearance 
Proceedings in Orange County, supra note 297. 
300 See id. at 67. 
301 See id. at 66–67.  An exception is made for domestic violence crimes—and an individual 
can be included in the program upon the victim’s approval. 
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Once a mental health professional finds the defendant capable of 
participation in services, and recommends that the court divert the 
defendant into services, the court will refer the defendant to the ap-
propriate services.  Such services may be PACTs, as well as alternative 
or additional services as needed.302  The court will also appoint a cor-
rections officer or social worker to design a specialized treatment 
plan and supervise the progress of such treatment.303 
Though the Florida program seems to be on the right track gen-
erally,304 it is problematic in several respects.  Primarily, the program’s 
exclusion of violent offenders is troubling, because it leaves those 
who presumably would require the most help out of the program and 
without treatment.305  Arguably, the state would have a greater interest 
in protecting potential victims from violent offenders, and is thus less 
motivated to divert these offenders into treatment rather than incar-
ceration.  However, this very reasoning delegitimizes the program.  If 
the program is in fact based on the premise that those suffering from 
mental illness who commit a crime because of that illness should not be 
penalized under the criminal system and should instead receive 
treatment and other social services, why should the nature of the of-
fense matter?  Does a violent offense cancel out the fact that the of-
fense is a result of a mental illness, while other, less severe crimes do 
not? 
The exclusion of violent offenders who are mentally disordered 
also conflicts with the program’s proclaimed mission to provide men-
tally disordered offenders with the most appropriate treatment to 
their needs, while still ensuring community protection.306  This is a 
balancing task between the offender’s need for treatment and the 
public’s safety.  It is not clear why this balance is achievable only when 
the offense is not a violent one.  After all, if the offender’s mental 
disorder is at the root of the offense, and if that mental disorder is 
 
302 See id. at 68–69.  This takes place as early in the judicial process as possible, preferably as 
early as the first hearing. 
303 See id. at 69. 
304 Searches of legal databases have not resulted in material discussing the program, or its 
efficacy.  I therefore base my analysis on the regulations alone. 
305 As discussed in Part I, people with mental health problems are usually violent when ill-
ness is co-occurring, that is when they suffer from more than one mental health problem 
in conjunction.  These tend to be the more complex cases.  See Benjet et al., supra note 
43, at 240 (reviewing research correlating violence, mental illness, and substance abuse); 
Izutsu, supra note 15, at 1018–19 (referring to study showing that risk of violence among 
people with schizophrenia is only heightened where there is co-occurring substance 
abuse). 
306 See Amended Order Governing Pretrial Release, Pretrial Detention, and First Appearance 
Proceedings in Orange County, supra note 297. 
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treated, then it would follow that the now mentally healthy offender 
will not pose a threat to public safety.  Again, the distinction between 
“regular” and “violent” crimes is puzzling.  Why have faith in treat-
ments’ ability to prevent future crimes but not their ability to prevent 
violent crimes?  Further,  if we do think that treatment can prevent 
violent crimes, but the risk for community safety is too great, why the 
blanket exclusion?  If the Florida program is serious about balancing 
treatment with community protection, it should be able to strike the 
balance on a case-by-case basis, rather than have an all-encompassing 
exclusion of violent offenders from the possibility of receiving treat-
ment. 
Lastly, in the context of families, there is also room for improve-
ment.  While the program excludes those who have committed 
crimes against children, it does allow domestic violence offenders to 
participate in the program and receive treatment, upon the victim’s 
consent.307  This deference to victims influences decisions regarding 
their mentally disordered aggressor, respects the victim’s agency and 
demonstrates an awareness of the complexity of crimes committed 
within the family, as well as an understanding that a victim may be in-
terested more in the offender’s recovery than criminalization.308  And 
though we should not always expect child-victims to be able to make 
this decision (particularly at a young age), it may be worthwhile to 
explore the possibility of treatment in some cases of crimes against 
children rather than, again, summarily dismissing treatment and ex-
cluding all cases of crimes against children from the diversion pro-
gram. 
Despite these flaws to the program, its recognition of the impor-
tance of social services and treatment is very encouraging.  Just as 
these legal frameworks utilize evidence-based programs, such as 
PACTs, as less restrictive alternatives to criminal proceedings, it can 
be advantageous to employ successful treatment services in other ar-
eas of law as well.  The next Part will present the benefits of PACTs to 
parents with schizophrenia and their neglected or abused children. 
C.  Reforming PACTs as Family-Oriented:  The Least Restrictive Mean 
PACTs’ status as an evidence-based, highly successful treatment 
for schizophrenia, as well as its incorporation into the criminal legal 
 
307 See id. 
308 See Rachmilovitz, supra note 291, at 505–07 (discussing the complexities of withdrawal 
from abusive relationships because of the dependence of the abused party on the ab-
user). 
840 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:3 
 
system, is reason to hope that PACTs can benefit families affected by 
parents’ mental illness and the consequent neglect or abuse of chil-
dren.  However, for PACTs to be successful in treating families as well 
as individuals, they should be redesigned to address the special needs 
of these families. 
Though PACTs that stray far from their original design are less 
successful in ensuring recovery, not all PACTs need be uniform to 
provide effective treatment.  As discussed above, PACT services are 
often reshaped to address a person’s specific needs.  It would follow, 
then, that for persons with schizophrenia who are struggling with 
raising their children, it would be most beneficial to create a family-
oriented PACT plan.  This Part discusses how, along with working to-
ward recovery, this type of treatment plan could potentially teach pa-
renting skills, provide mental health assistance to both parent and 
child (together or severally) and rebuild or strengthen a child-parent 
bond.  A successful plan can restore the child’s well-being in the 
home and alleviate concerns for her safety, thus eliminating the need 
to remove the child.  A family-oriented PACT also helps the parent 
recover and achieves both child protection and family preservation.  
Therefore it is narrowly tailored to serve the state’s compelling inter-
est, thus surviving constitutional scrutiny. 
1.  Family-Oriented PACTs—Why and How 
PACTs’ success lies in individual treatment plans that address the 
multiple and complex issues with which a person with schizophrenia 
is coping.  For those with children, participating in comprehensive 
family-oriented PACTs can be a path to recovery and a way to main-
tain family well-being.309  The holistic approach of family-focused 
treatment is particularly important to families of parents with schizo-
phrenia, because the child’s well-being is highly contingent on that of 
the parents.310  A great advantage to PACTs over other forms of 
treatment is that PACTs accomplish indirect recovery goals such as 
improved family dynamics, because PACTs provide comprehensive 
services and also offer competent specialized intervention, enabling 
 
309 See Walton-Moss et al., supra note 57, at 638–39 (identifying three types of management 
styles of families coping with mental illness: “Hanging On” families, “Being Stable” fami-
lies and “Doing Well” families.  Families may remain in earlier, more difficult stages of 
coping, and never progress toward “Doing Well” but for support and intervention). 
310 See Ackerson, supra note 4, at 191 (discussing the benefits of assessments “that include 
multiple, interdisciplinary sources of information in multiple contexts”). 
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parents to achieve more than basic recovery.311  Another benefit of 
family-oriented treatment is that by involving family members in 
treatment, as well as treating family members themselves, the collabo-
rative relationship between the family and the PACT team can en-
courage treatment adherence312 and ensure support toward recovery 
of the family as a whole. 
In addition to the basic standard PACT plan services, family-
oriented PACTs should be designed to include services such as as-
sessment of parenting skills, monitoring of child well-being, child de-
velopment and parenting training, family planning support, trauma 
and abuse counseling, marital and family counseling, and assistance 
with children’s education needs.313 
A potential concern about family-oriented PACTs is that by stray-
ing from the original model and its basic elements, the program risks 
its efficacy and compromises success.314  Yet this concern is relevant 
primarily to programs that detract from the basic standards or mini-
mum elements required to produce positive change.315  Unlike such 
programs, family-oriented PACTs do not eliminate elements from the 
basic program, but rather add to the model and complement other 
areas of treatment with family services.316  The success of family-
oriented PACTs already in place is evidence that these types of ser-
vices do not derail treatment, but instead reduce family conflict and 
strengthen the family as a positive support system.317 
An additional challenge that family-oriented PACTs may present 
is the ethical obligation of PACT team members.  Service providers 
treating families as a whole, or as individuals, now may face added 
conflicts of interests between their clients, as they would become ob-
ligated to uphold confidentiality and other professional duties to sev-
eral clients whose treatment is interrelated but whose interests, as 
embodied in the treatment plan, may conflict.  Such challenges to 
 
311 See Gold et al., supra note 9, at 297 (examining the training, supervision and consultation 
by PACT experts). 
312 See Busch & Redlich, supra note 50, at 1001 (finding that for at least some parents, stigma 
and fear of losing child custody resulted in delaying needed treatment). 
313 See Ackerson, supra note 4, at 192 (examining programs designed to teach parenting skills 
to mothers with schizophrenia); Mason et al., supra note 6, at 1118 (discussing multidisci-
plinary service needs identified in a study by Cook and Steigman (2000)). 
314 See Gold et al., supra note 9, at 294 (“Programs with highest relative fidelity to key ele-
ments of the PACT model seem to produce the strongest outcomes.”). 
315 See id. at 297.  These basic elements for PACTs can be team size and configuration, 
staff/client ratios, admission criteria, treatment planning, frequency of contact, etc. 
316 See id. (discussing the PACT alliance with other community resources and the involve-
ment of family, social and community networks). 
317 Id. at 294–95. 
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ethical duties and professional responsibilities have inspired broad 
discussions in different professions from social services to medicine 
and law.  It could be helpful to adopt some of the solutions utilized 
by those professions.  One common method is the use of informed 
consent318:  the service provider discusses the conflict with all parties 
involved, presents available actions that could resolve the conflict and 
their consequences in an attempt to secure their awareness and con-
sent to the conflict or to its proposed resolution. 
Family-oriented PACTs would require specialized training of staff 
and allocation of resources to manage the multiple and complex is-
sues of family treatment.319  Yet shifting the PACT team’s focus from 
treating one individual to supporting her whole family in the context 
of her unique circumstances is instrumental to family preservation.  
These comprehensive PACTs take on broader, more encompassing 
treatment goals that are family-oriented.  They therefore increase 
family functioning and lead to positive outcomes regarding parenting 
skills, family relationships and children’s well-being.320  As such, 
PACTs are a strong and useful tool for preventing child removal or 
termination of parental rights, and thus preserving a family in which 
a parent is on her way to recovery and the child is out of harm’s way. 
2.  Family-Oriented PACTs—Narrowly Tailored and Preserving Families 
To ensure the substantive due process rights of parents and chil-
dren, their fundamental right to family preservation can only be in-
fringed upon by the state if the state’s action is narrowly tailored to 
serve the compelling state interest in protecting children.  Compared 
to removal or termination, which infringe on family integrity, services 
provided through family-oriented PACTs are a much less extreme 
measure to ensure children’s safety.  This narrowly tailored, less re-
strictive mean should replace removal or termination whenever pos-
sible.  Similar to the use of PACTs as an alternative to criminal pro-
ceedings, families would be better served if legislatures and courts 
would establish PACTs as the default measure in cases of abuse or 
neglect of children to parents with schizophrenia.  Only upon a 
 
318 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(4) (2002). 
319 See Mason et al., supra note 6, at 1117 (“There is a need to provide continuing education 
for clinicians to move from treating only the client with the mental illness and to begin 
viewing the family as a unit and the focus of care.”). 
320 See id. at 1106–07 (“Mental health advocates stress that with the right services and sup-
ports, many parents with mental illness and their families can remain together and func-
tion adequately.”). 
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PACT’s failure to facilitate the parent’s recovery, or to guarantee the 
child’s protection, should removal or termination be considered. 
Recall ASFA and the critique regarding the statute’s mandate to 
provide “reasonable” services to parents, which in effect results in 
very limited or no services.321  Incorporating PACTs as an alternative 
clarifies the adequate standard for services the state is to provide.  In-
deed, such detailed guidelines limit judicial discretion because the 
court is no longer free to decide which services are reasonable.  Of 
course, judicial discretion is not eliminated.  Rather, discretion shifts 
from a formal test to a substantive one.322  Courts would now look at 
the adequacy of service when clear, pre-determined standards for 
treatment are available.  The courts would now exercise discretion in 
deciding whether these services were provided in a manner that satis-
fies the “reasonable” requirement in ASFA.  This would ensure that 
families do in fact receive a minimal standard of services from the 
state. 
Additionally, utilizing PACTs as an alternative to removal or ter-
mination challenges the presumption established in the Virginia stat-
ute; that a parent with schizophrenia is an unfit parent and should 
therefore be separated from her child.  Instead, PACTs are an oppor-
tunity for parents to improve their parenting skills and to take an ac-
tive role in creating a healthier environment for themselves and their 
children.  By affording parents this vital opportunity, lawmakers shift 
the default paradigm; a parent is no longer unfit due to a mental dis-
order alone.  Such a finding regarding the parent’s fitness would in 
effect now require a finding based on in-depth scrutiny, that a parent 
is unable to recover and regain parental skills despite the availability 
of a PACT program. 
As a preventative measure that lessens the need for removal or 
termination as a way to protect children and still maintain family in-
tegrity, PACTs comport more with substantive due process than cur-
rent interventions which do not prioritize family preservation.  Such 
interventions only attempt family preservation after a child has al-
ready been removed, usually in cases of emergency.  This may be too 
little, too late.  While separating the child from her parent protects 
her from neglect or abuse by her parents, it exposes her to other 
 
321 See supra Part I.C.1. 
322 A ruling whether certain types of services are reasonable would be a formal test, while in-
quiring into whether the services themselves, the way they were provided and their effi-
cacy for a particular family, were adequate would be a substantive test.  Further discussion 
of such a substantive test is out of the scope of this paper, and I therefore leave it to fu-
ture work. 
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harms.  By maintaining family preservation and preventing removal, 
PACTs help safeguard the parent-child attachment, which in turn 
minimizes risks for later termination of parental rights.323  Provision 
of services can prevent unnecessary removal and pursuant termina-
tion, and allow children to remain in their parents’ care.324 
Additionally, by centralizing all services provided to the family 
under one roof, rather than delegating them to different authorities 
(such as mental health systems and child welfare), PACTs’ coordi-
nated services facilitate their efficiency.325  The concern for conflict-
ing treatments or gaps in treatment is mitigated, as well as the need 
for time-consuming, costly communications between different service 
providers, assuming these communications do occur.  Because of 
PACTs’ efficiency and success, they are less intrusive than other inter-
ventions.  PACTs are able to be effective in a short period of time, 
and therefore they are less obstructive to family life than removal or 
termination, which are more prolonged processes. 
Not only are PACTs less restrictive than removal or termination, 
but they serve the state’s interest on a broad scale.  In addition to al-
lowing a child to remain in her parent’s care, PACTs address the par-
ent’s and the child’s need for treatment or support, strengthen pa-
rental skills and restore attachments and healthy family dynamics.  In 
doing so, PACTs achieve recovery for parents and protection for 
children—both of which can be viewed as state interests on a macro 
level, all without removing children into foster care which infringes 
on parents’ and children’s rights to family preservation and substan-
tive due process. 
D.  Potential Challenges to Utilizing PACTs 
Despite the advantages to family preservation, incorporating fam-
ily-oriented PACTs as a less restrictive alternative to child removal or 
termination of parental rights has its shortcomings.  In this Subpart I 
present two possible counterarguments to PACTs and explain how 
they can be rebutted. 
 
323 See Huntington, supra note 201, at 690 (“In the ideal model of family group conferencing 
the conference occurs before removal, thus the risk of damaging the bond between par-
ent and child by preemptive removal is minimized.”). 
324 See Ramsey, supra note 181, at 24 (“A major concern was that children were being re-
moved from their homes unnecessarily when the provision of services could have allowed 
them to stay home.”). 
325 See Ackerson, supra note 4, at 189 (citing a study of case management clients in Massachu-
setts). 
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1.  Do PACTs Achieve Child Protection? 
To pass muster under the substantive due process test, in addition 
to being least restrictive, PACTs must also serve the state’s compelling 
interest:  child protection.  A significant concern is that allowing 
children to remain in their parents’ care while the family participates 
in a PACT program leaves children vulnerable to neglect or abuse, 
and that PACTs can only ensure child protection at the end of a 
process, but not in cases of imminent danger.  For this reason, I 
would advise cautious optimism and close supervision. 
PACTs might not be appropriate in each and every case.  My pro-
posal here is not to mandate PACTs whenever a child is at risk as a re-
sult of a parent’s struggle with schizophrenia.  I merely argue that 
substantive due process requires that courts consider PACTs as a first 
line of defense, rather than resorting to removal or termination.  As 
long as courts are mindful of the possibility for treatment through 
PACTs as a preventative alternative to removal, they are able to ex-
plore the adequacy and potential for success of this opportunity on a 
case-by-case basis.326 
It may be useful for courts to think of parents with schizophrenia 
as falling into one of three groups.327  The first group would include 
parents who are capable of safely raising their children and therefore 
should not be separated from their children at all.  In the second 
group are parents who will likely benefit from PACTs over a longer 
period of time.  Here, if courts find it necessary to remove children 
because of an emergency, the length of separation should be strictly 
limited with the goal of reuniting families as soon as the PACT pro-
gram starts producing positive results.  The last group would com-
prise of parents who are incapable of raising their children, and 
where prospects of a PACT being successful are too dim.  Courts 
would decide which parents belong in which group, keeping in mind 
that the third group should be strictly limited to only the most severe 
and hopeless cases.  Only if the court has taken a PACT into account 
but found it highly likely to fail in that particular case (if a parent is 
unable or unwilling to consent or participate, or if a child is in severe 
 
326 This Article proposes PACTs as a generally available less restrictive alternative, but it is 
out of its scope to address or propose tests to distinguish cases where PACTs would be 
appropriate and those where removal is still a better suited option for child protection. 
327 I leave the matter of which guidelines or tests are appropriate for courts to distinguish 
between parents in each group to future scholarship.  Such attempt is out of the scope of 
this Article because it detracts from my main argument that PACTs should, at the very 
least, be considered as an alternative before removal of children or termination of paren-
tal rights. 
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imminent danger which a PACT could not relieve, for example), and 
a PACT becomes a futile attempt at a less restrictive alternative, then 
removal or termination would become a preferable measure that sat-
isfies substantive due process. 
In cases of emergency, for instance, Virginia law allows social ser-
vices agencies to remove the child from her home for up to four 
hours.  Within this short period of time, social services are to petition 
for a court issued emergency removal order.328  In the petition, the 
agency must show that reasonable efforts to prevent removal have 
been made, and that there are no less restrictive alternatives to re-
moval that would ensure the reasonable protection of the child.329  
This proceeding seems like a good opportunity to incorporate a 
PACT into the process.  First, the initial removal is for a very limited 
period of time, which can help eliminate concerns regarding harm to 
a child that is separated for longer and placed in foster care.  Second, 
as this statute requires the court to consider less restrictive means, 
evaluating the efficacy of a PACT in such cases of emergency is not a 
far cry from what courts are currently directed by law to do.  If the 
court still is not persuaded that a PACT will ensure a child’s safety, 
then there may be no other way but to remove the child beyond the 
initial four hours. 
Lastly, because of the nature of PACTs as hands-on comprehen-
sive services, the PACT team can closely supervise the progress of 
parents and children and report back to the court if need be.  By 
constantly monitoring families, the team would be able to notice 
whether neglect or abuse are ongoing.  Their awareness and familiar-
ity with the family should allow PACT teams to intervene quickly by 
changing or intensifying services to ensure the child’s safety.  Again, 
in extreme cases, PACTs might be unable to help families recover 
and prevent harm to children, and therefore there would not be an 
alternative that would protect children as well as maintain family in-
tegrity. 
Because PACTs may not be able to ensure a child is always safe 
from harm or neglect or abuse, they should be evaluated in the con-
text of a particular case.  Children’s safety should not be compro-
 
328 VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-251(A) (2008). 
329 Id. § 16.1-251(A)(2).  The statute suggests alternatives such as “medical, educational, psy-
chiatric, psychological, homemaking or other similar services to the child or family” as 
less drastic.  To bolster courts’ awareness about PACTs as possible interventions that are 
less drastic, the Virginia legislature would do well to specify them in this section of the sta-
tute.  Perhaps more preferably, lawmakers could make PACTs the default, less drastic al-
ternative for courts and social services to explore. 
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mised, and occasionally there is no alternative to family separation.  
To comply with substantive due process rights it is not necessary for 
courts to always utilize PACTs as a less restrictive means; it is, how-
ever, crucial that courts are aware of PACTs’ benefits and strengths 
and, at the very least, take them into account as a possible alternative 
to removal where appropriate. 
2.  Are PACTs Positive Rights? 
Another possible opposition to utilizing PACTs as an alternative to 
removal or termination is the objection to creating an expansive wel-
fare system that overly burdens the state.330  Provision of services re-
quires states to actively step into the private sphere of families, and, as 
such, can be viewed by some as a positive right that is inconsistent 
with ideas of personal liberty and principles of non-interventionist 
government.  I offer two main responses to this argument:  one, that 
state intervention in the form of PACTs in effect protects liberty in-
terests; and, two, that because the state cannot avoid interfering in 
cases of families so severely affected by a parent’s schizophrenia, it 
must take measures that are effective and in accordance with due 
process rights. 
As discussed above, family preservation is a fundamental right that 
stems from coupling the expansive freedom parents hold in the 
childrearing process331 and the child’s interest in remaining in her 
parents’ care.  These aggregated rights are a liberty independent of 
the state, so long as parents’ childrearing decisions are reasonable 
and the child is not harmed.332  Thus, a state that allows families to 
participate in PACTs in an attempt to achieve family preservation 
protects their liberties and enables them to exercise that liberty in the 
only way that can preserve it continuously.  Put differently, without 
 
330 As to the possible financial burden on states utilizing PACTs, because of the high costs of 
foster care, prolonged removal or termination proceedings and hospitalization, it is pos-
sible that establishing PACTs will be more cost-effective.  Also, since a number of states, 
including Virginia, already have PACTs in place providing services to people with schizo-
phrenia, utilizing them would not require the allocation of as many funds as would be re-
quired when creating PACT teams.  Regarding the cost efficiency of family preservation 
services compared to foster care, see generally ROBERTS, supra note 71, at 134–35. 
331 See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (finding it “entirely plain that [a 
particular Act of Congress] unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guar-
dians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”). 
332 See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 199, at 36 (discussing the “minimum degree of care” parents 
need to exercise in order to prevent state intervention); GUGGENHEIM ET AL., supra note 
209, at 94 (“A parent’s past behavior is relevant in child protection only to the extent that 
it reflects on a parent’s capacity to raise children adequately in the future.”). 
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PACTs, parents suffering from schizophrenia are on a “fast track”333 to 
lose their children.  Therefore, PACTs are vital to preserving their 
liberty interests.  State intervention through PACT services, effec-
tively, does not infringe on family preservation, but rather is needed 
to facilitate it.334  Instead of framing PACTs as positive rights (that is, 
that one has a right to services through PACTs), a more accurate 
framing of the issue would be a framework which recognizes a 
broader right to family preservation and PACTs as the means to ac-
complish that broader liberty. 
Another justification for the use of PACTs, even as a positive right, 
is the state’s compelling interest in child protection.  Due to this 
compelling interest one would be hard pressed to argue against state 
intervention altogether.  However, once the state intervenes, it must 
provide effective interventions, rather than interventions that could 
prove futile.335  Currently, the standard the law employs is that services 
are “reasonable.”  This is considered the appropriate standard, be-
cause it balances the need for intervention with the potential burden 
to the state.  However, “reasonable” is in effect an inadequate stan-
dard for services provided by the state.  As seen in the case of Toms v. 
Hanover Department of Social Services,336 “reasonable” services can turn 
into no services at all because courts may find that in the case of men-
tally disordered parents where a prima facie case of unfitness exists, 
the state is not obligated to provide services.  Therefore, to ensure 
services that—again—protect multiple rights and interests,337 perhaps 
the standard should be elevated to adequately reflect the gravity of 
such rights and interests. 
A standard of “effective” services guarantees that services are not 
futile and that public resources invested in providing services do not 
 
333 See Ackerson, supra note 4, at 188 (“Policies intended to promote a speedier resolution 
for children in out-of-home care may have an unintended discriminatory effect by sin-
gling out parents who have a diagnosed mental illness for ‘fast track’ termination of their 
parental rights.”). 
334 See Wasow, supra note 137, at 220 (“[D]enial of services clearly implicates liberty interests 
of enormous magnitude.  The strong, constitutionally protected interest at stake for the 
parent should militate in favor of giving her an opportunity to try to address the circum-
stances that led to the child being taken into foster care.”). 
335 See Mary Ellen C. v. Arizona Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 971 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Ariz. 1999).  In this 
case, the mother who suffered from several co-existing mental disorders challenged a de-
cision to terminate her parental rights.  The court found that “although the State is not 
obliged to undertake futile rehabilitative measures, it is obliged to undertake those which 
offer a reasonable possibility of success.”  Id. 
336 616 S.E.2d 765, 771 (Va. Ct. App. 2005). 
337 Among such rights and interests are the right to family preservation, substantive due 
process rights, the state’s interest in protecting children and even its interest in parents’ 
and children’s mental health. 
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go to waste.  Services that are merely reasonable may not be suitable 
for parents with schizophrenia and their children, and thus may be 
doomed to fail.  Services that are not designed to address the unique 
needs of parents with schizophrenia are unsuccessful; parents do not 
adhere to treatment, and they are often unable to learn and imple-
ment them in their lives.338  PACTs, contrastingly, do increase treat-
ment adherence and produce positive results for participants.  There-
fore, because states have chosen to intervene and to offer services 
that can be seen as positive rights, they should do so in a manner that 
is fruitful and beneficial to participants.  PACTs have proven to be 
just that. 
CONCLUSION 
The impact of schizophrenia on families is disheartening, and 
while children are vulnerable to harm if left at home, their well-being 
is not ensured by separating them from their parents.  As a compre-
hensive treatment plan, PACTs hold great potential for positive 
growth.  Because it already has operating state-sponsored PACTs, Vir-
ginia can become a true trailblazer for many other jurisdictions if it 
changes current law governing parents with mental illness to incor-
porate PACTs as a preventative alternative for family separation.  The 
result would be improving the mental health of parents and children, 
better protecting children, and preserving families according to sub-
stantive due process rights. 
Such a change in the law dealing with struggling families can be 
expanded beyond the context of mental illness to other instances 
where parental unfitness is questioned.  Perhaps better protections of 
substantive due process rights and family preservation are available 
for parents with substance abuse problems, parents involved in crim-
inal proceedings, or divorcing parents challenging each others’ fit-
ness.  I leave these matters, though, for future endeavors. 
In this Article, I attempted to challenge family separation and lay 
a foundation for better serving the needs of families that struggle 
with schizophrenia, not as parties with opposing interests, but as one 
collective in need of support.  PACTs’ comprehensive care brings on 
 
338 See Ackerson, supra note 4, at 191.  Ackerson states that social services that are designed to 
improve parenting skills are not fitted for parents with mental illnesses.  Parents with 
mental illness, then, often drop out of such programs or—if they do participate—are un-
able to benefit from them.  “[T]he didactic method of instruction combined with the se-
verity of [these parents’] illness may impede their ability to apply the lessons to their own 
situations.”  Id. 
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recovery and well-being to all family members, as well as produces 
healthier family dynamics.  Already endorsed by certain legal systems, 
PACTs, I believe, are the superior, less restrictive alternative that 
serves parents.  Only when lawmakers and social services providers 
join together to optimally advance families are parents and children 
ensured their due process rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
